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Modern Choice of Law and Public Policy:
The Emperor Has the Same Old Clothes
JOHN BERNARD CORR*
The author critically evaluates the adoption of the modern
learning model in choice of law analysis. After evaluating the
judiciary's use of this model in seven jurisdictions, the author
concludes that the traditional learning is better suited to
resolving choice of law issues.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In most states, courts now apply modern approaches to choice
of law1. Their application is disparaging because of the scholarship
* Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and
Mary; A.B., 1963, A.M., 1964, John Carroll University; Ph.D., 1971, Kent State University;
J.D., 1978, Georgetown University.
I am grateful to my colleagues, Robert C. Palmer, Doug Rendleman, and Frederick
Schauer, for their thoughtful criticisms of an earlier draft of this article. I also am indebted
to my research assistant, Mark Thrash, who bore the burden of cite checking with unfailing
good humor.
1. For the purpose of this article, the "modern approaches" to choice of law will denote
those techniques by which courts identify states with interests in a particular issue before a
court, and then decide which of the interested states has the greatest interest in having its
law applied. See R. LEPLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 92, at 185-86 (3d ed. 1977).
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upon which these modern approaches to choice of law rest. When
traditional approaches2  still predominated in American courts,
critics of the traditional learning inadvertently enjoyed a special
advantage. Years of experience with older choice of law rules of-
fered ample opportunity to expose the presumed weaknesses of the
traditional learning as it actually operated. Moreover, until modern
approaches substantially supplanted the traditional rules, no body
of experience existed by which to test the quality of the modern
scholarship's proffered alternatives. In short, advocates of the
modern learning were for many years as well placed as a fencer
who is allowed to thrust without the burden of having to parry.
Now that the modern approaches have held wide sway for a
decade or more, however, the opportunity exists to detemine if the
new techniques achieve the superior blend of justice, predictabil-
ity, and consistency their proponents have claimed for them.3 One
Although legal scholars have made efforts to draw meaningful distinctions between the
various strains of modern learning that have appeared over the years, it never has been clear
that those distinctions have made much practical difference to the courts. Id. § 99, at 100
("[AJII the modern theories are being bundled together by the Courts, to make up the new
law of choice of law."); E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 17.11, at 567-68 (1982):
"The case law which employs [modern approaches] presents a confusing picture. Imprecise
and over-zealous citations to sundry authorities often make it difficult to determine with
any kind of certainty on what theory a case may be said to have been decided, if indeed the
theories are fully distinguishable." (Footnote omitted).
2. For the purpose of this article, the "traditional approaches" to choice of law will
denote the method that the Restatement establishes. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS- (1934). This method does not rest upon a determination of the most interested state.
Instead, the traditional approaches typically apply the law of the situs, i.e., the state in
which events giving rise to a cause of action occurred. In tort actions, this rule of lex loci
commonly results in the application of the law of the state in which the last event necessary
to constitute a tort occurred; in contract actions, lex loci usually looks to the law of the
place of contracting for questions that go to the validity of a contract, and to the law of the
place where the contract will be performed for questions that go to contract performance.
For a further development of the traditional approaches, see id., §§ 377-90.
3. Advocates of modern learning recognize that when traditional rules are applied with-
out regard to just results, they will operate in a rather predictable, uniform way. See B.
CURRIE, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, in SELECTED
ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 100 (1963) ("The most forceful affirmative defense that
can be made for the traditional method is that it leads to uniformity of result, regardless of
the state in which the action is brought."). Advocates of modern learning often point out,
however, that courts operating under traditional rules tend not to apply those rules without
regard to results. Instead, when faced with the prospect that application of traditional rules
will produce unjust results, such courts may manipulate the traditional rule through devices
such as public policy. Such manipulation, of course, undermines predictability and uniform-
ity. See B. CURRIE, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict of
Laws, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 159 (1963) ("The uniformity and cer-
tainty promised by the system are therefore to a large extent illusory."). Advocates of mod-
ern learning, therefore, promote their systems as not only operating well, but also as some-
times more predictable than the traditional rules. See, e.g., Leflar, Choice of Law: A Well-
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way to make this determination is to examine the way the doctrine
of "public policy" actually operates in selected states that utilize
modern choice of law thinking as well as in those jurisdictions that
adhere to the traditional rules.
For the purpose of choice of law, one may define public policy
as that doctrine which permits a court to reject a cause of action
based on the law of a different jurisdiction on the ground that the
other jurisdiction's law is not only different from but also offensive
to generally accepted values within the forum.4 The doctrine is an
especially useful vehicle for evaluating the merits of modern and
traditional learning, because it is one of the few features of the old
learning to have survived the last generation's surge into modern
choice of law thinking. Indeed, it appears that no matter which
variation of modern learning a state may have adopted, public pol-
icy is retained as an instrument for adjudicating choice of law is-
sues.' Public policy, therefore, is a rare point of common ground
upon which one may directly compare the actual operation of
traditional and modern approaches.
Based on the examination that will follow, the thesis of this
article is that proponents, at best, have greatly overstated their
claims of success for the modern approaches. In fact, the recent
application of public policy doctrine in American courts demon-
strates that modern approaches have failed completely to use pub-
lic policy in a manner superior to the way in which the traditional
learning uses it. Because the legitimacy of modern approaches rests
Watered Plateau, 41 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 10, 26 (1977) ("[Choice] of law is being lifted
up by the courts to a well-watered plateau high above the sinkhole it once occupied.");
Rendleman, McMillan v. McMillan: Choice of Law in a Sinkhole, 67 VA L. REV. 315, 328
(1981) ("Certainty and predictability are now developing as the courts apply policy-oriented
tests to current choice-in-law problems in tort cases."); Sedler, Choice of Law in Michigan:
A Time to Go Modern, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 829, 850-51 (1978) ("The clear majority of courts
in this country which adopted the policy-centered approach in the wake of their abandon-
ment of the traditional approach have applied it effectively.").
4. A standard source has described public policy in the following manner:
Under the traditional approach to choice of law, the forum's territorially-ori-
ented rule might refer to a law, the enforcement of which would be offensive to
the public policy of the forum. In these circumstances, the forum might then
refuse to entertain the foreign cause of action and, in effect, deny the plaintiff
access to its courts.
E. SCOLES & P. HAY, Supra note 1, § 3.15, at 72-73.
5. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 90 (1971); see also Muth v.
Educators Sec. Ins. Co., 114 Cal. App. 3d 749, 170 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1981) (not applying for-
eign law that violates California public policy); Ehrlich-Bober & Co. v. University of Hous-
ton, 49 N.Y.2d 574, 404 N.E.2d 726, 427 N.Y.S.2d 604 (1980) (applying foreign law when not
in violation of New York public policy).
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heavily on the assumption that those approaches are superior to
older rules, the failure of modern approaches to make any headway
with public policy indicates, if it does not prove, that modern
learning is a fortress built over a sinkhole - superficially formida-
ble, but prone to collapse under the additional weight of close ex-
amination of its actual operation.
The article will begin with a summary of the typical objections
advocates of modern approaches have to the use of public policy as
applied in traditional choice of law. Then, using some forty-odd
cases decided since 1976 in which public policy was an issue, the
article will assess and compare the application of public policy in
courts still operating under traditional rules with the way courts
that have adopted modern approaches have applied it. That com-
parison will demonstrate that the public policy doctrine is not sig-
nificantly different under either approach. The conclusion will of-
fer suggestions for extricating choice of law doctrine from the
conundrum in which it is currently trapped, and assess the weak-
nesses public policy exposes in modern systems.
II. PUBLIC POLICY AND THE COMMENTATORS
Opponents of traditional approaches have zeroed in on the
public policy doctrine with regularity. In the 1920s, before modern
learning had made any progress, Professor Lorenzen wrote that
"[t]he doctrine of public policy in the Conflict of Laws ought to
have been a warning that there was something the matter with the
reasoning upon which the rules to which it is the exception were
supposed to be based."'6 Professor Cavers had a more measured ap-
proach, but he still struck at public policy for "its somewhat cava-
lier dismissal of a foreign law, [dispensing] with the necessity for
close analysis."'7 The triumph of the modern learning did not end
the criticism. Professors Reese and Rosenberg have characterized
6. Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 736,
747 (1924).
7. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173, 184 (1933).
Professors Paulsen and Sovern had some qualified words of defense for the doctrine. See
Paulsen & Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969, 980-88
(1956) (courts usually apply public policy only when the forum has an important interest in
the outcome of the case). At the same time, Professors Paulsen and Sovern also describe
public policy as a potential "substitute for thinking" or a "means of shifting responsibility
for a decision." Id. at 987, 988. One conclusion they reach is that in tort actions, "[1little but
the unhappy ingredient of local pride is added by analyses in terms of public policy." Id. at
994.
[Vol. 39:647
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public policy as "a brute force type of. . . argument,"" and Profes-
sor Weintraub has encapsulated resistance to public policy in a
single sentence:
The danger of the traditional view of public policy is that its
operation is likely to be haphazard and that, if utilized to avoid
a result on the merits, the forum is more likely to deny enforce-
ment to foreign law than if the forum faces the issue squarely
and applies either forum law or foreign law to dispose of the
case on the merits.9
The focal point of the criticism, then, is the failure of courts using
public policy to identify and adhere consistently to an articulated
standard against which scholars and practitioners could measure
arguments for the application of public policy. Failure to use such
a standard, the reasoning goes, releases courts from their obliga-
tion to refrain from arbitrary decision-making based on a judge's
highly personalized notion of justice: thus, Professors Reese and
Rosenberg's characterization of public policy as mere "brute
force." A string of judicial decisions often cited in support of that
sort of arbitrariness comes from the courts of New York, which
have scuffled with questions of public policy about as long as
anyone.
This line of authority began with Loucks v. Standard Oil
Co.,10 a suit arising from the death of a New York domiciliary in a
Massachusetts highway accident. The Massachusetts wrongful
death statute differed from comparable New York law, because
Massachusetts established both a minimum and a maximum award
that plaintiffs could recover. Judge Cardozo concluded that the
court should apply Massachusetts law, because it did not "violate
some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception
of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal.""
In the eyes of the commentators, Judge Cardozo established an ad-
mirably high threshold that had to be attained before the court
would invoke a public policy exception.' 2
Some subsequent New York decisions, however, indicate that
there was less to the Loucks standard than met the eye. In Mertz
8. W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS 467 (8th ed.
1984).
9. R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3.6, at 84 (2d ed. 1980).
10. 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
11. Id. at 111, 120 N.E. at 202.
12. See, e.g., R. LEFLAR, supra note 1, § 48, at 91. (Judge Cardozo afforded "enlightened
hospitality to extrastate causes of action.").
19851
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v. Mertz,13 the court of appeals refused to enforce Connecticut law
permitting a wife to sue her husband in tort. The court reasoned
that, because New York law afforded spouses immunity from such
liability, it would violate New York public policy to enforce the
Connecticut cause of action. Mertz's reasoning identified a side of
Loucks that the commentators did not highlight. If determination
of public policy were left wholly to judicial identifications of "fun-
damental values," there would be a distinct risk that a judge with
different views might ignore constitutional and legislative declara-
tions of the forum that were important to a state. Mertz tried to
assure appropriate deference to forum law.
The courts may not read into the law a limitation created by a
supposed public policy, founded on [their] own notion of expedi-
ency and justice .... [T]he courts [may not] disregard a limi-
tation, contained in the law of the state, established by author-
ity and tradition, because the court could not discern a sound
public policy back of the law.1'
The commentators, however, saw something else in Mertz's as-
sertion that "a state can have no public policy except what is to be
found in its Constitutions and law."' 15 Scholarly comments pro-
tested that invocation of the Mertz public policy test would pre-
clude application of foreign law in the large number of choice of
law cases where foreign law differed from forum statutes. As com-
mentators saw the situation, the result would be that public policy,
intended to be no more than an exception to general choice of law
rules, would actually supplant those rules in the majority of
cases. 16
13. 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936).
14. Id. at 473, 3 N.E.2d at 599. Judge Lehman did not think the forum's common law
was entitled to as much deference as its constitution and statutes. "Only the unwritten law
resting upon judicial precedent is plastic. . . . [I]n formulating a rule, individual notions of
public policy may be given effect only where the court finds that its own notion of public
policy is so generally held and so obviously sound that it is in fact a part of the law of the
state." Id. at 471-72, 3 N.E.2d at 599.
15. Id. at 472, 3 N.E.2d at 599.
16. See, e.g., R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 9, § 3.6, at 83 ("Judge Lehman's definition of
public policy was so parochial that, if applied literally, all conflicts analysis would be ended.
No foreign rule that differed from local law could be applied at the forum."); W. REESE & M.
ROSENBERG, supra note 8, at 391 (quoting with apparent approval Curtis v. Campbell, 76
F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 737 (1935) for the notion that if the forum
refuses to apply foreign law on public policy grounds, because foreign law contradicts forum
law, then courts could rarely enforce foreign law). But see R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 9, §
3.6, at 84 ("There is, however, nothing wrong with Judge Lehman's definition of public pol-
icy as everything found in the laws of the forum if the policies underlying those laws are
utilized to assist in articulating a reasoned choice between the law of the forum and the law
[Vol. 39:647
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Commentators just as strongly criticized the more recent opin-
ion in Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 7 which involved facts
very similar to those in Loucks. In Kilberg, a New York domicili-
ary bought an airplane ticket in New York for a trip between New
York and Massachusetts. The New Yorker was killed when the
plane crashed in Massachusetts. The choice of law issue before the
court was whether to apply Massachusetts's limitation on recovery
in wrongful death actions. This time, unlike Loucks, the New York
Court of Appeals concluded that the Massachusetts limitation vio-
lated New York public policy. Noting that the New York constitu-
tion had long prohibited any limitation on recovery, 18 Chief Judge
Desmond staked out the court's position in no uncertain terms:
The absurdity and injustice [of limitations on recovery in
wrongful death actions] have become increasingly apparent in
the six decades that have followed [enactment of the constitu-
tional prohibition]. For our courts to be limited by this damage
ceiling (at least as to our own domiciliaries) is so completely
contrary to our public policy that we should refuse to apply that
part of the Massachusetts law. 9
As in Mertz, the commentators' quarrel with Kilberg is with
the reasoning, not the decision. As Professor Weintraub saw it, "a
wise and desirable resolution of the true conflict . . . was made to
appear an unfortunate step backward to the narrowly provincial
thinking that relied upon the epithets of 'procedural' and 'public
policy' to avoid applying a rule different from that of the forum. 20
Professors Reese and Rosenberg took issue with the court's
of some foreign jurisdiction.").
Advocates of the modern approaches object only to the reasoning of Mertz and not to
the result. See R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 9, § 3.6, at 83 ("the result in Mertz may not have
made eminent functional sense."). The reasoning is that under a modern approach, applica-
tion of New York law would still be the correct result; New York was the state where the
husband and wife were domiciled and it, therefore, had the most significant relationship
with the case.
17. 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
18. Judge Cardozo, in the Loucks opinion, never mentioned that the New York consti-
tution prohibited limitations on recovery in wrongful death actions. By disregarding that
prohibition, the court in Loucks gives credence to Judge Lehman's concern expressed in
Mertz that a literal reading of Loucks affords judges-public officials who may be appointed
instead of elected and who may not be intended to serve as community representatives in
the same way that legislators are representative-almost unbridled discretion to apply their
personal notions of "good morals" and "deep-rooted traditions." Loucks, 224 N.Y. at 111,
120 N.E. at 202.
19. 9 N.Y.2d at 40, 172 N.E.2d at 528, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 136.
20. R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 9, § 6.15, at 300-01.
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"sledgehammer use of the 'public policy' argument."21 Still another
source considered Kilberg an example of the "abuses of the public
policy exception. '22
A final widely cited New York public polcy case is Interconti-
nental Hotels Corp. v. Golden,3 in which a Puerto Rican gambling
establishment sought to enforce gambling debts incurred by a New
York domiciliary in Puerto Rico. The debts, and the underlying
gambling activity, were lawful in Puerto Rico. In New York, people
who gambled in such a manner were outlaws, "and all gambling
contracts made with them are void. '2 4 Rejecting a public policy de-
fense to the Puerto Rican debt, the court of appeals also repudi-
ated the Mertz standard of public policy and returned to the test
enunciated in Loucks:
Public policy is not determinable by mere reference to the laws
of the forum alone. Strong public policy is found in prevailing
social and moral attitudes of the community .... [W]e should
measure [public policy] by the prevailing social and moral atti-
tudes of the community which is [sic] reflected not only in the
decisions of our courts in the Victorian era but sharply illus-
trated in the changing attitudes of the people of the State of
New York. The legalization of pari-mutual betting and the oper-
ation of bingo games, as well as a strong movement for legalized
off-track betting, indicate that the New York public does not
consider authorized gambling a violation of "some prevalent
conception of good morals [or], some deep-rooted tradition of
the common weal." [citing Loucks].2 5
Golden has enjoyed immunity from the criticism that attaches to
Mertz and Kilberg. In fact, commentators even have praised
Golden.2
The pattern of praise for Loucks and Golden and of criticism
of Mertz and Kilberg discloses an interesting correlation. Com-
mentators have praised decisions that reject the public policy argu-
ment but have criticized decisions that uphold public policy excep-
tions. A suspicious individual might conclude that commentators
who advocate modern approaches simply do not like public policy,
21. W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 8, at 467.
22. R. CRAMTON, D. CuRRiE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES-COMMENTS-QUBS-
TIONS 14S (3d ed. 1981).
23. 15 N.Y.2d 9, 203 N.E.2d 210, 254 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1964).
24. Id. at 14, 203 N.E.2d at 212, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 530.
25. Id. at 14-15, 203 N.E.2d at 212-13, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 530-31.
26. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 1, § 48, at 91 (In Golden, Judge "Cardozo's enlightened
hospitality to extrastate causes of action has ... been reinstated.").
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at least as applied in traditional systems. Of course, correlation
and causation are not always the same, and in any event, it may be
unfair to base any conclusion about commentator bias on a data
base containing only four samples. It is, however, the cited com-
mentators - all advocates of at least one of the modern ap-
proaches - who chose those New York decisions as the foundation
for so much of their assessments of public policy as it operated in
the traditional systems. It is, therefore, not unfair to ask why com-
mentators, who defend the modern approaches, have so much diffi-
culty approving traditional-approach decisions in which applica-
tion of public policy exceptions worked well. 7 Perhaps it is, as the
commentators would have us believe, that public policy simply
does not work well in the traditional scheme. But sometimes fail-
ure appears because that is what the viewer wants to see. 8 Failure
may also be relative; one may excuse a jockey who finishes second
in a two-horse race for characterizing his own performance as "sec-
ond-best" and his opponent's arrival at the wire as "next to last."
Similarly, defenders of the modern approaches have largely left
undone any serious effort to compare the operation of public policy
under the old scheme with its operation under the modern
approaches.
That comparison is now overdue. Before turning to an assess-
ment of public policy under traditional and modern approaches,
however, a reader should store one fact gleaned from the commen-
tators' dissection of public policy cases in New York: commenta-
tors have strongly criticized courts in New York operating under
traditional rules for invoking public policy as identified in (1) state
law at least nominally intended to further a state's policy of foster-
ing stability in families2" and (2) a provision of the state constitu-
tion.30 When this article proceeds to a discussion of the use of pub-
27. The author has used two of the standard conflict of laws casebooks, inter alia, as
sources of commentary about public policy in the traditional learning. Although both
casebooks devote substantial space to analysis and criticism of the application of traditional
approach public policy, neither book identifies a single case in which invocation of public
policy under the traditional rules has worked well. See W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, supra
note 8, at 384-99; R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, supra note 22, at 126-31, 135-45.
28. Cf. Speech by Winston Churchill, House of Commons (Jan. 22, 1941), quoted in J.
BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 744 (1980) ("I do not resent criticism, even when, for the
sake of emphasis, it parts for the time with reality.").
29. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text; see also W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 902 (5th ed. 1984) (One reason offered for interspousal immunity is
that interspousal actions "would destroy the peace and harmony of the home.").
30. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
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lic policy in the modern learning,31 that fact will be a useful
benchmark by which to measure the improvement modern learning
has allegedly brought to choice of law.
III. PUBLIC POLICY AND THE TRADITIONAL LEARNING
A. General Standards for Identifying Public Policy
Of twenty-one cases in which courts operating under tradi-
tional choice of law rules addressed public policy issues, thirteen of
the courts invoked public policy and refused to apply foreign law."2
Among the courts that addressed the sources of forum public pol-
icy," a general consensus exists on one point: mere dissimilarity
between foreign and forum law should not in and of itself give rise
to the invocation of forum public policy. '4 Beyond that point of
agreement, views as to the sources of public policy are both sweep-
ing and notably fluid. The Supreme Court of Tennessee found
31. See infra notes 118-218 and accompanying text.
32. Dothan Aviation Corp. v. Miller, 620 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1980); Resorts Int'l Hotel,
Inc. v. Agresta, 569 F. Supp. 34 (E.D. Va. 1983); Wixom Bros. Co. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 435
So. 2d 1231 (Ala. 1983); Condado Aruba Carribbean Hotel, N.V. v. Tickel, 39 Colo. App. 51,
561 P.2d 23 (1977); Hao Thi Popp v. Lucas, 182 Conn. 545, 438 A.2d 755 (1980); King Int'l
Corp. v. Voloshin, 33 Conn. Supp. 166, 366 A.2d 1172 (Super. Ct. 1976); Temporarily
Yours-Temporary Help Services, Inc. v. Manpower, Inc., 377 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1st DCA
1979); Nasco Inc. v. Gimbert, 239 Ga. 675, 238 S.E.2d 368 (1977); Sweeney v. Sweeney, 402
Mich. 234, 262 N.W.2d 625 (1978); Shaheen v. Schoenberger, 92 Mich. App. 491, 285
N.W.2d 343 (1979); Leonard v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 309 N.C. 91, 305 S.E.2d 528
(1983); State ex rel. Meierhenry v. Spiegel, Inc., 277 N.W.2d 298 (S.D. 1979), appeal dis-
missed for lack of a fed. question, 444 U.S. 804 (1979); M.I.I. v. E.F.I., Inc., 550 S.W.2d 401
(Tex. Civ. App. 1977), cert. denied 435 U.S. 1008 (1978).
Federal courts sitting in diversity are obligated to apply the choice of law rules of the
state in which they sit. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). Therefore,
they should reach the same choice of law result that a state court would reach: For this
reason, the author, in this study, cites federal decisions interchangeably with state court
decisions.
33. The general rule is that a court considering a public policy issue will evaluate only
the public policy of the forum. See, e.g., Norris v. Kunes, 166 Ga. App. 686, 305 S.E.2d 426
(1983) (The court did not consider the public policy of Maine.). The same approach applies
in states that have submitted to the modern learning. See National Starch and Chemical
Corp. v. Newman, 577 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (New York and Georgia public policy
is no defense to the application of Missouri law.). But see International Aircraft Sales, Inc.
v. Betancourt, 582 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (The court refused to enforce contracts
that parties formulated to violate the law of another country, even if the contracts were not
contrary to the public policy of the forum or of the jurisdiction in which the parties enter
into them.).
34. See, e.g., Terry v. Mays, 161 Ga. App. 328, 329, 291 S.E.2d 44, 45 (1982) (quoting
with approval, 16 Am. JuR. 2d 45 Conflict of Laws § 20, at 45-47, "[Mlere dissimilarity of
law is not sufficient for application of the public policy doctrine."); Turner v. Ford Motor
Co., 81 Mich. App. 521, 265 N.W.2d 400 (1978) (per curiam) (Merely showing that Georgia
law is different does not give rise to invocation of Michigan public policy).
[Vol. 39:647
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Tennessee's public policy in the state's "constitution, its statutes,
and the decisions of its courts." 5 Other courts provided standards
for determining public policy that are even broader and less pre-
cise. Very often such standards appear to vest great discretion in
the courts. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals, for example,
stated Maryland's standards with respect to public policy:
[P]ublic policy is no more and no less than what is believed by
the courts and the legislature to be in the best interests of the
citizens of this State. Anything that tends to undermine or erode
either the declared or the undeclared best interest of the general
health or moral welfare is said to be against public policy. 6
The first sentence of this declaration evokes the Tennessee
standard; but, the second sentence indicates that Maryland's
courts are free to find public policy in arguably subjective values
not reached by Maryland's constitution, statutes, or courts. The
North Carolina Court of Appeals used a single disjunctive conjunc-
tion to afford itself the same broad discretion: "Comity will not be
so extended where the situs rule is abhorrent to the public policy
of our state . . . or where it would operate in opposition to settled
statutory policy or override express statutory provisions of this
state. '3 7 In a case involving covenants not to disclose information
35. Hyde v. Hyde, 562 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tenn. 1978). See also State ex rel. Meierhenry
v. Spiegel, Inc., 277 N.W.2d 298, 300 (S.D. 1979), appeal dismissed for lack of a fed. ques-
tion, 444 U.S. 804 (1979) ("The primary sources for declarations of the South Dakota public
policy in areas such as the one presently under consideration are the constitution, statutory
law and judicial decisions.").
A year before the cutoff date for this study, the Michigan Court of Appeals defined
public policy in a way that anticipated Hyde. Branyan v. Alpena Flying Serv., Inc., 65 Mich.
App. 1, 236 N.W.2d 739, 743 (1975) ("The public policy of a state is fixed by its constitution,
its statutory law, and the decisions of its courts; and when the Legislature enacts a law
within the limits of the constitution, the enactment insofar as it bears upon the matter of
public policy is conclusive."). Only a few years later, however, the same Michigan court
applied a somewhat different public policy standard. Deciding to apply a Georgia statute of
limitations rather than its own, the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected a public policy argu-
ment. "We see nothing immoral, unjust to, or inconsistent with the interests of our citizens
in applying this statute of limitations." Turner v. Ford Motor Co. 81 Mich. App. 521, 526,
265 N.W.2d 400, 403 (1978) (per curiam).
36. Linton v. Linton, 46 Md. App. 660, 661, 420 A.2d 1249, 1251 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1980). In contrast to the central role Maryland courts may play in identifying public policy,
Tennessee courts are assigned a role that is distinctly secondary to the preeminent legisla-
tive responsibility for identifying public policy. See Hyde v. Hyde, 562 S.W.2d 194, 196
(Tenn. 1978) ("Primarily, it is for the legislature to determine the public policy of the state,
and if there is a statute that addresses the subject in question, the policy reflected therein
must prevail.").
37. Leonard v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 59 N.C. App. 454, 457, 297 S.E.2d 147, 149-
50 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 305 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1983) (emphasis in original).
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and not to compete, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that cove-
nants that detrimentally "affect the interests of this state" impli-
cate public policy.3 8
These few cases are representative of most opinions in which
courts using traditional rules tried to identify general public policy
standards. Taken together, these cases suggest several common
characteristics: first, courts using traditional rules do not appear to
have established a consensus on a suitable standard for applying
public policy; moreover, at least some courts appear determined to
define public policy in a manner that preserves for the courts al-
most absolute discretion in determining what may constitute pub-
lic policy in a particular case; 9 and finally, whatever praise the
commentators may heap on the public policy standard Judge Car-
dozo declared in Loucks,40 it remains a standard that traditional-
approach states have not generally adopted. Declared law and ap-
plied law, however, are not necessarily coterminous; and it remains
to be seen how or if these public policy characteristics, as enunci-
ated, translate into issues of public policy in particular cases.
B. Public Policy as Applied Under the Traditional Approaches
1. SOURCES OF PUBLIC POLICY
When courts operating under traditional rules decide to in-
voke a forum public policy, among the sources of public policy that
they cite are the following kinds of statutes: wrongful death legisla-
tion affording broader possibilities of recovery than the situs state
would have allowed;41 legislation permitting the enforcement of
38. Nasco, Inc. v. Gimbert, 239 Ga. 675, 676, 238 S.E.2d 368, 369 (1977). The language
of the court closely tracks the command of a Georgia statute:
The laws of other states and foreign nations shall have no force and effect of
themselves within this state further than is provided by the Constitution of the
United States and is recognized by the comity of the states. The courts shall
enforce this comity, unless restrained by the General Assembly, so long as its
enforcement is not contrary to the policy or prejudicial to the interests of this
state. [Emphasis added].
GA. CODE § 1-3-9 (1981).
39. Indeed, advocates of modern approaches are opposed to almost any use of the pub-
lic policy exception. It also may be true that many traditional approach courts prefer to
keep standards of public policy as broad and as vague as possible. The result is that a court
could simply pull public policy off the shelf and use it to reach a particular result, without
having to explain the result in terms of a principled methodology.
40. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text. See also J. MARTIN, CONFLICT OF
LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS 134 (2d ed. 1984) (Loucks is the "classic definition" of public
policy.).
41. Shaheen v. Schoenberger, 92 Mich. App. 491, 285 N.W.2d 343 (1979).
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covenants not to compete that are reasonable as to duration and
geographic area;42 prohibition on termination of parental rights ex-
cept when approved in a judicial proceeding;4" criminal prohibi-
tions on gambling;" civil legislation making gambling debts void;4 5
state antitrust law making unenforceable agreements granting ex-
clusive sales rights;46 and a forum rule of procedure permitting a
third party to prove an employer's negligence if the employer sued
the third party to recover sums paid through worker's compensa-
tion to an injured employee. 47
Other cases invoking public policy identify case law as their
source. These courts deem judicial decisions in the following areas
as a source of public policy sufficient to justify not applying con-
trary foreign law: holdings that unreasonable covenants not to
compete are unenforceable; 4 a declaration that parents are no
longer immune to suits by their children; 4 a decision making un-
enforceable an insurance contract clause restricting the insurer's
liability to the period in which insured products were manufac-
tured, rather than to the period in which they produced injury; e
and a decision that gambling debts were unenforceable."
42. Temporarily Yours-Temporary Help Serv., Inc. v. Manpower, Inc., 377 So. 2d 825
(Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
43. Hao Thi Popp v. Lucas, 182 Conn. 545, 438 A.2d 755 (1980).
44. Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc. v. Agresta, 569 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Va. 1983), aff'd, 725 F.2d
676 (4th Cir. 1984); Condado Aruba Caribbean Hotel v. Tickel, 39 Colo. App. 51, 561 P.2d
23 (1977).
45. Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc. v. Agresta, 569 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Va. 1983), aff'd, 725 F.2d
676 (1984); King Int'l Corp. v. Voloshin, 33 Conn. Supp. 166, 366 A.2d 1172 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1976).
46. M.LI. v. E.F.I., Inc., 550 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
1008 (1978).
47. Leonard v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 309 N.C. 91, 305 S.E.2d 528 (1983).
48. Dothan Aviation Corp. v. Miller, 620 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1980); Nasco, Inc. v. Gim-
bert, 239 Ga. 675, 238 S.E.2d 368 (1977).
49. Sweeney v. Sweeney, 402 Mich. 234, 262 N.W.2d 625 (1978).
50. Wixom Bros. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 435 So. 2d 1231 (Ala. 1983).
51. Condado Aruba Caribbean Hotel, N.V. v. Tickel, 39 Colo. App. 51, 561 P.2d 23
(1977). In this case, the court cited both statutes and case law as sources of public policy.
See supra note 44 and accompanying text. Condado Aruba is a most unusual case, however,
because the court invoked public policy to prevent enforcement of gambling debts, notwith-
standing the fact that the Colorado legislature had repealed a statute that prohibited their
enforcement. The court reasoned that existing criminal gambling statutes and a prerepeal
Supreme Court of Colorado decision that declared enforcement of gambling debts a viola-
tion of public policy constituted a sufficient basis for concluding that public policy pre-
vented enforcement of the gambling debt. The Colorado appellate court dismissed the re-
peal itself with more than a touch of insouciance. "[R]epeal . . . does not necessarily
evidence an intent by the legislature to change the existing policy." 39 Colo. App. at 53, 561
P.2d at 24. As well as any case, Condado Aruba demonstrates what a court can do when it is
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In the decisions in which courts refused to invoke public pol-
icy, parties pleaded unsuccessfully for the use of forum public pol-
icy on the basis of the following statutes: legislation prohibiting a
clause in an uninsured motorist insurance policy discharging the
insurer's obligation to pay if the insured settled with an uninsured
motorist without the insurer's consent;52 a statute of limitations on
loss of consortium more restrictive than the foreign statute;53 a no-
fault divorce law very similar to that of the foreign jurisdiction;"
forum estate statutes permitting a testator to bequeath more than
a third of his estate to a charitable institution;55 and usury legisla-
tion." Courts found that the following kinds of forum case law did
not implicate public policy: decisions enforcing covenants not to
compete that are reasonable as to duration, geographic area, and
purpose;57 a holding that owners of leased vehicles could be liable
in tort to employees of the lessor who drive the leased vehicles;5"
and forum case law upholding interspousal tort immunity.5 9
The range and breadth of laws that courts have used to justify
the invocation of public policy is striking. In fact, these laws are so
diverse that they may even exceed the sweep of the laws in which
courts, operating under the traditional approaches, have found no
public policy implications. At least superficially, this phenomenon
supports two criticisms of public policy in the traditional system:
first, courts apply public policy so widely that it becomes the rule
rather than the exception;e0 second, courts apply public policy so
randomly that no one is able to predict when and where a court
will implicate public policy." Discussion of the first criticism
unbridled by standards of public policy and free to follow its individual predilections. See
supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
52. Terry v. Mays, 161 Ga. App. 328, 291 S.E.2d 44 (1982).
53. Turner v. Ford Motor Co., 81 Mich. App. 521, 265 N.W.2d 400 (1978).
54. Hyde v. Hyde, 562 S.W.2d 194 (Tenn. 1978).
55. Memphis State Univ. v. Agee, 566 S.W.2d 283 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977).
56. Continental Mortgage Investors v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 395 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 1981)
(enforcing 396 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)).
57. Barnes Group, Inc. v. Harper, 653 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
921 (1982).
58. Sexton v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 84 Mich. App. 69, 269 N.W.2d 308 (1978), rev'd
on other grounds, 413 Mich. 406, 320 N.W.2d 843 (1982).
59. Linton v. Linton, 46 Md. App. 660, 420 A.2d 1249 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980).
60. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
61. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text. In some measure, of course, those criti-
cisms are contradictory; when courts apply an exception routinely, they no longer apply it
unpredictably. The apparent contradiction is of little consequence, however, because even if
only one of those two criticisms is correct, the legitimacy of public policy as courts apply it
under the traditional approaches is seriously undermined.
[Vol. 39:647
MODERN CHOICE OF LAW
should probably await the sense of perspective that a similar sur-
vey of public policy as applied under modern approaches will af-
ford."2 Assessment of the second criticism also may benefit by such
a comparison. In the meantime, however, one must assess whether
the traditional system's use of public policy is as unpredictable as
it first appears.
Until this point, the survey of public policy in traditional
courts treated all public policy decisions interchangeably, irrespec-
tive of the court from which they came. Such an approach can mis-
lead. While it may be desirable to achieve uniformity in law across
the country, it is certainly possible for an individual state to stand
back from the mainstream and still enjoy efficient and just law.
Another test of the predictability of public policy in the traditional
system, therefore, is the manner in which public policy operates
within a particular jurisdiction. Fortunately, the courts of two
traditional approach states, Michigan63 and Georgia, have had
enough recent experience with public policy cases to provide a rea-
sonable sample of the workings of public policy within a state.
2. PUBLIC POLICY IN MICHIGAN
In a recent study, Professor Sedler, one of the more enthusias-
tic advocates of the modern learning, chronicled the experience of
Michigan courts with traditional choice of law rules in tort ac-
tions. 64 Professor Sedler's conclusion was highly critical of the way
the traditional approaches, including the exception for public pol-
icy, had operated in Michigan:
Choice of law in Michigan is in a shambles. It is impossible to
predict when the Michigan Court of Appeals or the federal
courts in Michigan will again decide to resort to "manipulative
techniques," or when one panel of the court of appeals will re-
fuse to follow the lead of another panel; or of the federal courts
in employing them .... The results in conflicts torts cases are
neither sound nor predictable. It is all one big mess.65
62. See infra notes 119-218 and accompanying text.
63. Michigan has adopted a modern approach to choice of law in recent years. See Sex-
ton v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 413 Mich. 406, 320 N.W.2d 843 (1982). Nevertheless, Mich-
igan's prior extensive experience with traditional public policy is a useful source of data.
Georgia's decisions are useful to this discussion, because its courts have produced enough
recent choice of law decisions to make a meaningful analysis possible. For the same reason,
this article will also examine California and Texas decisions to analyze modern learning
public policy in greater depth. See infra notes 176-218 and accompanying text.
64. Sedler, supra note 3.
65. Id. at 847.
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Cases implicating public policy were among the prominent
targets of Professor Sedler's criticism. The Michigan courts in-
voked public policy in two decisions to bar the application of for-
eign law in providing interspousal tort immunity. In a third hold-
ing, the court used public policy to prohibit a limitation on
recovery in wrongful death actions. Professor Sedler dismissed all
of these cases as employing "manipulative techniques" to do "good
work;"66 in other words, the courts in these cases attempted to
achieve just results without providing a principled, predictable jus-
tification for the result achieved. Professor Sedler also criticized
less directly a fourth case in which a Michigan court refused to use
public policy to permit a suit between spouses that the law of the
jurisdiction in which the cause of action had arisen would have
barred. 7 Professor Sedler did not criticize that case for failing to
invoke public policy; rather, he was critical of the court's analysis
as well as its result. He would prefer that Michigan law apply to a
suit between Michigan spouses, no matter where the cause of ac-
tion arose, because Michigan's interest in the matter was greater
than that of any other state. s
Three decisions of the same genre appeared in the years im-
mediately following Professor Sedler's article. In Turner v. Ford
Motor Co.,e9 the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected a defendant's
argument that Michigan's public policy should bar the application
of a foreign statute of limitations affording more time to bring a
suit for loss of consortium than Michigan law provided:
It is contended that Michigan's policy is to apply the same stat-
ute of limitations to all claims arising from a single tortious
transaction. Assuming that to be true, it merely shows that
Georgia law is different, not that its enforcement would violate
public policy. We see nothing immoral, unjust to, or inconsistent
with the interests of our citizens in applying this statute of
limitations.70
66. Id. at 843-44, 854.
67- Id. at 844.
68. Id. at 847-49. Neither Professor Sedler nor other advocates of the modern ap-
proaches seem interested in determining whether domiciliary status describes a current (and
perhaps highly transient) legal status, or whether it is evidence of a long-run state interest
in domiciliaries as they would like it to be. See Corr, Interest Analysis and Choice of Law:
The Dubious Dominance of Domicile, 1983 UTAH L. REv. 651 (documenting that domicile is
commonly a flawed and misleading indicator of a state's long-run interest in having its law
applied).
69. 81 Mich. App. 521, 265 N.W.2d 400 (1978) (per curiam).
70. Id. at 526, 265 N.W.2d at 403.
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In Sexton v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 1 the same court reasoned
that stare decisis precluded the use of Michigan public policy to
bar application of foreign law immunizing the owner of a leased
vehicle from suit.7 2 Similarly, in Shaheen v. Schoenberger, 7 the
court of appeals used stare decisis to conclude that Michigan pub-
lic policy barred use of a foreign limitation on recovery in a wrong-
ful death action.7 4 These fragile sprouts of stare decisis may seem
to offer hope that the Michigan courts might eventually make the
traditional rules work well enough to provide some of the predict-
ability that any body of law should offer; yet, this optimism would
be misplaced. At some point, someone would be certain to notice
the weakness of the distinction between foreign law limiting recov-
ery in wrongful death actions (barred by Michigan's public policy)
and foreign law immunizing certain classes of potential tortfeasors
(not barred by Michigan's public policy). At that point, stare deci-
sis based on such weak reasoning would likely break down. Profes-
sor Sedler is right. In Michigan, public policy as applied under the
traditional rules was "one big mess."
Consensus on the confusion of the Michigan courts, however,
should only beget more questions. Is the Michigan experience typi-
cal? Is it possible that the subject matter of the Michigan deci-
sions, causes of action arising in tort, may be less amenable to ra-
tional public policy analysis than other substantive areas of law?
Finally, have the modern approaches achieved the success that the
traditional approaches cannot reach? Fortunately, data is available
to begin answering such questions. The Georgia courts, which use
traditional rules, recently have decided enough public policy cases
to offer a comparison with the Michigan experience. Moreover, the
Georgia cases arise chiefly in the area of contract, an area of law
that the Michigan courts did not have before them. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, the judiciary has had enough experi-
71. 84 Mich. App. 69, 269 N.W.2d 308 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 413 Mich. 406,
320 N.W.2d 843 (1982).
72. The court of appeals considered the issue settled by the Supreme Court of Michi-
gan's decision in Kaiser v. North, 292 Mich. 49, 289 N.W. 325 (1939) (applying a foreign
automobile guest statute that completely barred a passenger's cause of action). In Kaiser,
the court specifically rejected a public policy argument in favor of applying Michigan law.
Id. at 57, 289 N.W.2d at 328. The court in Sexton v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. described the
argument in favor of invoking public policy as "logical and persuasive," but it treated the
matter as entirely closed. 84 Mich. App. at 72-74, 269 N.W.2d at 310.
73. 92 Mich. App. 491, 285 N.W.2d 343 (1979).
74. Id. at 493-94, 285 N.W.2d at 344 (citing Branyan v. Alpena Flying Service, Inc., 65
Mich. App. 1, 236 N.W.2d 739 (1975), one of the cases that Professor Sedler analyzed in his
study).
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ence with the modern approaches to see how results in courts using
modern rules compare with results achieved in traditional states.
Let us begin with Georgia's recent experience.
3. PUBLIC POLICY IN GEORGIA
Between 1977 and 1981, the Supreme Court of Georgia and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided
three choice of law cases involving the broad area of covenants not
to compete. In Nasco, Inc. v. Gimbert7 5 an employment contract
between a Tennessee corporation and a Georgia employee, to be
performed in Georgia, contained a covenant prohibiting "disclosure
of 'any information concerning any matters affecting or relating to
the business of employer' including but not limited to the identity
of any of employer's customers, its prices, (including the prices at
which it sells it products), and its production, manufacturing, sales
promotion and merchandising methods and systems.' ' 7" The con-
tract also contained a clause directing that it be construed under
Tennessee law. The Supreme Court of Georgia, however, held that
Georgia law overrides such a clause "where application of the cho-
sen law would contravene the policy of, or would be prejudicial to
the interest of, this state."'7 The court then concluded that it
should not enforce the covenant, because the nondisclosure provi-
sion was excessively broad and unreasonable.
In Dothan Aviation Corp. v. Miller7 8 the Fifth Circuit consid-
ered a contract between an Alabama corporation and a Georgia
employee that contained a covenant not to compete. The parties to
the contract had chosen Alabama law. Under Georgia law, the con-
tract was unenforceable, because Georgia law deemed the territo-
rial restriction on the employee unreasonable. Alabama law, on the
other hand, arguably vested the court with authority to rewrite the
territorial restriction to make it more reasonable and, therefore,
unenforceable. The court cited Nasco as a directive to construe the
contract under Georgia law and concluded that settled Georgia
case law stripped the court of any authority to rewrite the
contract.
79
The third covenant not to compete decision was Barnes
75. 239 Ga. 675, 238 S.E.2d 368 (1977).
76. Id. at 676, 238 S.E.2d at 369.
77. Id.
78. 620 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1980).
79. Id. at 506-07.
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Group, Inc. v. Harper,8" where the Fifth Circuit enforced the con-
tract, but only after applying Georgia law. The employer in Barnes
was a Delaware corporation with a principal place of business in
Connecticut, and the defendant was apparently a Georgia resident.
The parties to the contract chose the law of Ohio, but the court
disregarded the reference: "Georgia law holds that restrictive cove-
nants, which contravene the public policy of the State, are con-
strued under Georgia law if they are to be applied in Georgia."'81
The Georgia Court of Appeals added two additional public
policy cases to the recent Georgia record. In Commercial Credit
Plan, Inc. v. Parker,82 the court did not invoke public policy to bar
enforcement of a contract that was usurious under Georgia law, be-
cause the Georgia statute by its terms applied only to loans made
in Georgia.8 3 Similarly, in Terry v. Mays,s4 the court of appeals
enforced a South Carolina insurance contract not enforceable
under Georgia law. The court explained that Georgia public policy
was not implicated, because no prejudice to Georgia's public inter-
est arose from enforcing a contract made in South Carolina and to
be performed primarily in South Carolina. 85 Even before beginning
a closer analysis of the five preceding decisions, it already may be
clear that the state of public policy in Georgia is something other
than the "big mess" that characterizes Michigan's public policy ex-
perience. In the three Georgia cases implicating covenants restrict-
ing competition, courts followed the rule of stare decisis faith-
fully," and in a manner more defensible than the Michigan
practice.8 7 The adherence to precedent alone suggests at least some
predictability in the way Georgia will approach public policy ques-
tions. Moreover, those three decisions seem entirely in harmony
with repeated statements of the sources of public policy in Georgia.
The long-standing judicial rule is that foreign "laws will be en-
forced by comity in Georgia unless they are contrary to public pol-
80. 653 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 921 (1982).
81. Barnes, 653 F.2d at 178 n.4 (citing Nasco, Inc. v. Gimbert, 239 Ga. 675, 238 S.E.2d
368 (1977)). The Fifth Circuit enforced the covenant not to compete, because the covefant
was reasonable in terms of duration and territorial breadth. Id. at 179.
82. 152 Ga. App. 409, 263 S.E.2d 220 (1979).
83. Id. at 412, 263 S.E.2d at 223.
84. 161 Ga. App. 328, 291 S.E.2d 44 (1982).
85. Id. at 329, 291 S.E.2d at 45.
86. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text. Failure to follow stare decisis was
one of Professor Sedler's major criticisms of the Michigan courts. See supra note 65 and
accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
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icy or prejudicial to the interests of Georgia." 88 Superficially, that
pronouncement seems to contain enough play in the joints to
arouse the concerns that Judge Lehman discussed in Mertz.89 In
practice, the Georgia courts have been circumspect in invoking
public policy. As to covenants affecting competition, for example,
all the important sources of Georgia law demonstrate a long-stand-
ing and continuing aversion to contracts that restrict competition.
The Georgia constitution declares: "The General Assembly shall
not have the power to authorize any contract or agreement which
may have the effect of or which is intended to have the effect of
defeating or lessening competition, or encouraging a monopoly,
which are hereby declared to be unlawful and void."90
Similarly, the Georgia legislature has decreed that covenants
"in general restraint of trade" violate the public policy and are un-
enforceable.91 Finally, in domestic cases that do not give rise to
choice of law issues, the Supreme Court of Georgia has consistently
held that these constitutional and statutory public policy provi-
sions apply to covenants not to compete that are unreasonable "in
terms of time, territory, and activities protected."9 If that com-
bined, long-standing opposition by all the institutions of Georgia
that have primary responsibility for the care of the community
does not satisfy even Judge Cardozo's requirement of "some funda-
mental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good
morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal,"93 one
may wonder if the courts would ever invoke public policy. That
Georgia courts did not invoke public policy in circumstances where
judges could not identify similar state interests94 also points to the
same conclusion; in recent contract decisions implicating public
policy issues, the record of the Georgia courts is both rational and
predictable.
It does not fit well with much of the criticism of traditional
learning that courts occasionally demonstrate consistent and pre-
88. Rohner, Gehrig & Co. v. Capital City Bank, 655 F.2d 571, 579 (5th Cir. 1981). Roh-
ner could have been a public policy case, but the Fifth Circuit precluded consideration of
choice of law issues by disallowing any amendments to the pleadings. Id. at 516.
89. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
90. GA. CONST. art. 3, § 6, 5(c) (1981).
91. GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-2 (1981).
92. Thomas v. Best Mfg. Corp., 234 Ga. 787, 788, 218 S.E.2d 68, 70 (1975); see also
Howard Schultz & Assoc. of the Southeast, Inc. v. Broniec, 239 Ga. 181, 183, 236 S.E.2d 265,
267 (1977) ("By both constitutional and legislative provision, Georgia prohibits contracts or
agreements in general restraint of trade.").
93. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
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dictable use of the traditional approaches. In and of themselves,
however, such demonstrations do not necessarily fend off criticism.
Often they merely divert critical comment into other channels.
One assessment adopted by advocates of modern approaches, in
such circumstance is to depict such phenomena as the happy but
purely fortuitous outcome of an individual court's determination to
reach the "right" result, even if the court had to torture the tradi-
tional rules to achieve it. An example of that reasoning is Professor
Sedler's dismissal of the use of public policy in Michigan as a mere
"manipulative technique" that the courts used to circumvent
traditional rules to achieve just results that could have been
achieved through the principled use of a modern approach. 5 A sec-
ond, related criticism comes in the suggestion that when tradi-
tional learning courts achieve happy results, it is because they have
surreptitiously adopted a modern analysis. Professor Sedler also
provided an example of that criticism. Analyzing one of the Michi-
gan decisions that reached a "good" result, he remarked: "The
Michigan Court of Appeals. . .concluded that it would be against
Michigan's 'public policy' to limit the amount of damages recover-
able for wrongful death. It then proceeded to employ interest anal-
ysis, which in this case of false conflict led to the application of
Michigan law." '96
Implicit in such criticism is the suggestion that modern ap-
proaches can offer the same results that traditional rules often
strain to achieve, and that modern learning achieves these results
in a different and more principled fashion. Further analysis of the
Georgia decisions, however, indicates that the suggestion is not al-
ways well founded.
In the cases addressing covenants restricting competition, the
application of modern techniques without invoking a "manipula-
tive technique" of public policy probably would not have produced
results identical to those that the Georgia courts achieved. The dif-
ference is that courts applying modern approaches typically have
adopted the principle of party autonomy in matters of contract.
95. Sedler, supra note 3, at 839-47; See also R. WEiNTRmUB, supra note 9, § 3.6, at 83
(suggesting that Mertz could have achieved the same result using interest analysis). Speak-
ing of another "manipulative technique," Professor Leflar wrote:
It is apparent that the characterization technique is being used to achieve results
that must be justified, if at all, by other real reasons. That other real reasons
may exist cannot be doubted. The valid questions are as to what the real reasons
are, and why a cover-up device should be manipulated to conceal-them.
P. LA ,.a, supra note 1, § 88, at 178.
96., Sedler, supra note 3, at 843.
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That is, when the parties insert in their contract a provision that
the courts are to apply the law of a particular jurisdiction, modern
approaches normally direct the court to respect the parties' choice
of law.9 7 Absent considerations of public policy, the only important
exception to that deference to party autonomy arises when the
state chosen "has no substantial relationship to the parties or the
transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties'
choice."98 The Georgia cases demonstrate how different would be
the use of such a rule without the "manipulative technique" of
public policy.
In Nasco, Inc. v. Gimbert,9' one of the parties was a Tennessee
corporation, and the parties agreed that Tennessee law would gov-
ern. The Supreme Court of Georgia said the contract raised public
policy questions and therefore applied Georgia law.100 Under a
modern approach not using pulic policy, however, the court would
have had to use Tennessee law, because Tennessee had a reasona-
ble relationship to one of the parties. In Dothan Aviation Corp. v.
Miller,' one of the parties was apparently an Alabama corpora-
tion, and the contract provided for application of Alabama law.
The Fifth Circuit cited Georgia public policy and applied Georgia
law; but under a modern approach, without public policy, the court
would have had to apply Alabama law. Only in Barnes Group, Inc.
v. Harper,1 2 would the result have been the same under either ap-
proach. A court using traditional approaches would (and did) use
Georgia public policy to apply Georgia law; absent a "manipulative
technique," a modern approach would have justified use of Georgia
law, because the contract specified the application of the law of a
state (Ohio) that had no apparent relation to either the parties or
the subject of the contract.
In short, in the three recent Georgia decisions that used tradi-
tional approach public policy, and apparently applied it in both a
just and doctrinally principled fashion, 03 the courts achieved re-
sults that were substantially different from the results a modern
approach court would reach without the use of public policy. Only
by adopting a "manipulative technique" of public policy could a
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
98. Id.
99. See supra note 75.
100. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 78.
102. See supra note 80.
103. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
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modern approach court free itself from party autonomy and
achieve the same result the Georgia courts achieved under the
traditional learning.104
The second criticism of the successful application of tradi-
tional approaches to choice of law - that traditional learning deci-
sions based on a public policy exception are sometimes just a mod-
ern approach in disguise - has at least some superficial validity.
Nearly thirty years ago, Professors Paulsen and Sovern demon-
strated that the public policy exception was usually invoked only
when a forum had an important interest in the outcome of a case
before it.105 Moreover, some states, Georgia included, have explic-
itly identified their public policy rule with distinctive state
interests.106
Although the identification of a state interest may also be rele-
vent in both modern analysis as well as public policy in the tradi-
tional learning, what does this criticism really teach us? Is it a seri-
ous argument of the advocates of the modern learning that a forum
should invoke its public policy exception when the case before the
court will not affect the best interests of the forum? Surely Judge
Cardozo had the well-being of New York and its citizens in mind
when he wrote that public policy could indeed bar foreign law if it
violate[d] some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent
conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the com-
mon weal. ''10 7 The alternative to applying the public policy bar -
even to litigation that does not affect the basic values of the forum
- would be no more than judicial interference in the affairs of
another state. The point is that public policy in the traditional sys-
104. The adoption of a "manipulative technique," of course, is precisely what has oc-
curred under the Second Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §
187(2)(b) (1971) (recommending that party choice control, unless "application of the law of
the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially
greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue"). It is
true, of course, that the Second Restatement nominally distinguishes between a state's "fun-
damental policy" in contractual choice of law cases and the sort of public policy analysis
both traditional approaches and the Second Restatement otherwise discuss. See id. com-
ment f. ("To be 'fundamental' within the meaning of the present rule, a policy need not be
as strong as would be required to justify the forum in refusing to entertain suit upon a
foreign cause of action under the rule of § 90 [the Second Restatement section that most
nearly approximates public policy under the traditional approach].") That attempt at a dis-
tinction, however, does not appear to have much practical consequence. See infra notes 119-
218 and accompanying text. For additional examples of modern learning courts that still
employ the public policy doctrine, see supra note 5.
105. See supra note 7.
106. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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tem is (or should be) an exception to the general principle of terri-
torialism that underlies the traditional learning. As such, it is en-
tirely reasonable that it rest on identification of some basic interest
of the forum. That it does so, and thereby converges momentarily
with an interest that also might have relevance to an analysis con-
ducted under modern learning, does not represent a surreptitious
surrender to the modern learning. Indeed, the difference between
public policy and the modern learning becomes obvious upon con-
sideration of one fact: traditional approach public policy is an ex-
ception to the rule that courts invoke infrequently, whereas mod-
ern approaches routinely depend upon identification of state
interests.
That Georgia courts may have succeeded in reaching just re-
sults though principled application of traditional choice of law
rules does not in and of itself offer any basis for weighing the rela-
tive merits of the traditional and modern approaches. It does not
even prove that public policy in the traditional system will rou-
tinely work as well as any legal doctrine should work. Perhaps it is
easier to work with public policy in contract matters; or perhaps
the Georgia courts merely have more facility with public policy
than their Michigan counterparts were able to achieve; or perhaps
the Georgia courts were just lucky. Whatever the apparent success
of the Georgia courts may not prove, however, that success does
suggest that the apparent failure of traditional rules should not be
as clear a conclusion as advocates of modern learning are prone to
reach. Success and failure are rarely measured in absolutes. Do not
lose sight of the jockey riding in the two-horse race; 08 success
should be measured by the available alternatives. How well have
the available alternatives, the modern approaches, worked in
application?
IV. PUBLIC POLICY IN THE MODERN LEARNING
After all the harsh words advocates of the modern learning
have directed at public policy,109 it is surprising that public policy
has survived the transition from the traditional approaches to the
dominance of the modern learning. It is a fact, however, that pub-
lic policy is a firmly rooted feature of modern choice of law doc-
108. See supra text following note 28.
109. See Cavers, supra note 7, at 184 and accompanying text (a "cavalier dismissal of a
foreign law"; a "substitute for thinking"); R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 9, at 84 and accompa-
nying text (a rule whose "operation is likely to be haphazard").
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trines."10 Commentators explain the apparent anomaly by sug-
gesting that public policy under modern approaches - what one
might call "good" public policy - differs significantly from the
"bad" public policy those commentators so often decried. Profes-
sor Weintraub, for example, wrote: "There is ... nothing wrong
with [a traditional] definition of public policy as everything found
in the laws of the forum if the policies underlying those laws are
utilized to assist in articulating a reasoned choice between the law
of the forum and the law of some foreign jurisdiction.""'
As a justification for using a public policy rule, however, it is
unclear exactly what statements like that mean. In fact, they look
very much like mere restatements of the modern view that state
interests should predominate in choice of law analysis, without any
need to consider public policy. What is clear, however, is that at
least some advocates of the modern learning claim to see a differ-
ence between "good" public policy and the "bad" public policy of
traditional learning. A test of the legitimacy of the modern learn-
ing, therefore, is to examine public policy in modern approach
states to determine-how much different it is from the public policy
that operated under the traditional rules.
A. General Standards for Identifying Modern-Learning Public
Policy
Of the twenty cases that the author found in which courts op-
erating under modern choice of law approaches addressed issues of
public policy, ten of the decisions invoked public policy and re-
fused to apply foreign law." '2 As with the courts operating under
110. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 90, 187(2)(15) (1971).
Courts also have used public policy in jurisdictions that have adopted modern approaches
nominally different from the approach of the Second Restatement. See, e.g., Muth v. Educa-
tors Sec. Ins. Co., 114 Cal. App. 3d 749, 170 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1981); Ehrlich-Bober & Co. v.
University of Houston, 49 N.Y.2d 574, 404 N.E.2d 726, 427 N.Y.S.2d 604 (1980).
111. R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 9, § 3.6, at 84; see also E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note
4, § 3.16, at 74-75 (noting that forum may use local public policy when its interests in the
case at bar are sufficient).
112. A word of caution is in order here. Sometimes it is not possible to be completely
confident about the nature of the choice of law rule under which a court has decided a case.
In Sexton v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., for example, the Supreme Court of Michigan seemed
to adopt a modern approach, at least where the case originated in tort and the parties were
from Michigan. 413 Mich. 406, 433, 320 N.W.2d 843, 854 (1982). The court's analysis was
stunningly opaque about what precisely it was doing. See id. ("We do not here adopt the
law of dominant contracts [sic) or any other particular methodology, although any such
reasoning may, of course, be argued where persuasive and appropriate.").
Shortly after Sexton, a federal district court in Michigan sitting in diversity decided a
choice of law issue. Muma v. Financial Guardian, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 119 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
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traditional rules, modern learning jurisdictions agree that mere
dissimilarity between foreign and forum law is not a sufficient jus-
tification to invoke forum public policy. 113 General statements
about the sources of public policy also struck a familiar note. In
modern approach states, favored sources of public policy are the
constitution, statutes, and the case law of the forum. Only the em-
phasis among those sources slightly varies. The New York Court of
Appeals said "courts of course are not free to indulge in mere indi-
vidual notions of expediency and fairness but must look to the law
as expressed in statute and judicial decision and to the prevailing
attitudes of the community."11 4 After finding public policy in state
statutes and in a decision of the state supreme court, a California
appellate court remarked:
[i]t is an equally well-established principle that courts "will
The court did not precisely describe the choice of law method that it used. It is possible,
and perhaps even probable, that the district court continued to act as though traditional
choice of law rules were still dominant in Michigan. Sexton may have played no role in the
decision, because the court did not cite it at any point (although it did cite earlier decisions
using Michigan's traditional approach). Thus, although modern approach courts decided
those two cases, the author does not rely upon them heavily in this study. For whatever it
may be worth, although the Sexton court rejected an argument to invoke public policy, in
Muma a public policy argument prevailed.
Another category of cases that occasionally crops up is that group of cases in which a
court used a choice of law rule at odds with the jurisdiction's adopted choice of law rule. In
Gulf Collateral, Inc. v. Morgan, for example, a federal court in Georgia hearing a diversity
case used both Restatements in its analysis. 415 F. Supp. 319 (S.D. Ga. 1976). One catego-
rizes such cases as a traditional or modern approach depending on which rule appears to
have most influenced the court in its decision, irrespective of which rule the court should
have used. For that reason, commentators categorize Gulf Collateral as a modern approach
decision.
In the following decisions, the courts invoked a public policy exception and refused to
apply foreign law: Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley, 622 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir.
1980); Resorts Int'l, Inc. v. Zonis, 577 F. Supp. 876 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Muma v. Financial
Guardian, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 119 (E.D. Mich. 1982); Blalock v. Perfect Subscription Co., 458
F. Supp. 123 (S.D. Ala. 1978), aff'd, 599 F.2d 743 (5th Cir. 1979); Gulf Collateral, Inc. v.
Morgan, 415 F. Supp. 319 (S.D. Ga. 1976); Wong v. Tenneco, Inc., 151 Cal. App. 3d 376, 198
Cal. Rptr. 526 (1984); Muth v. Educators Sec. Ins. Co., 114 Cal. App. 3d 749, 170 Cal. Rptr.
849 (1981); In Re Marriage of DeLotel, 73 Cal. App. 3d 21, 140 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1977); Ehr-
lich-Bober & Co. v. University of Houston, 49 N.Y.2d 574, 404 N.E.2d 726, 427 N.Y.S.2d 604
(1980); Clifton Steel Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 80 A.D.2d 714, 437 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1981).
113. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 321 (Tex. 1979) ("It is true that the
laws of Texas and Mexico still differ in several aspects. . . . However, these differences by
no means render the laws of Mexico violative of public policy. Each must be considered on
its own merits."); Untersteiner v. Untersteiner, 32 Wash. App. 859, 863 n.3, 650 P.2d 256,
259 n.3 (1982) ("[J]ust because there is a difference between the laws of a foreign state and
this state is not sufficient by itself to establish a violation of this state's public policy.").
114. Ehrlich-Bober & Co. v. University of Houston, 49 N.Y.2d 574, 580, 404 N.E.2d 726,
730, 427 N.Y.S.2d 604, 608 (1980)(citations ommitted).
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never give effect to a foreign law when to do so would prejudice
that state's own rights or the rights of its citizens, or when the
enforcement of the foreign law would contravene the positive
policy of the law of the forum whether that policy be reflected in
statutory enactment or not.'"1 5
The Supreme Court of Texas, a fairly recent convert to the Second
Restatement, held: "Texas courts will not enforce a foreign law
that violates good morals, natural justice or is prejudicial to the
general interests of our citizens . . . .This is a limitation recog-
nized by all jurisdictions."""
One small difference between the way traditional approach
and modern approach courts generally address the sources of pub-
lic policy is the willingness of courts operating under modern
learning to cite as their own, Judge Cardozo's standard in
Loucks." 7 That is not much of a difference, however, for many
modern learning courts then go on to cite precisely the same
sources of public policy as do the traditional approach states that
have not cited Loucks." 8
B. Public Policy As Applied Under the Modern Approaches
1. SOURCES OF PUBLIC POLICY
When courts operating under modern rules have invoked a fo-
rum public policy, the sources of public policy that they have cited
include the following kinds of statutes: legislation rendering cer-
tain categories of covenants not to compete null and void;" 9
prohibitions on the enforcement of gambling debts; 20 a statute
115. Muth v. Educators Sec. Ins. Co., 114 Cal. App. 3d 749, 170 Cal. Rptr. 849, 854
(1981)(quoting Thome v. Macken, 58 Cal. App. 2d 76, 79, 136 P.2d 116, 117-18 (1943)).
116. Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 321 (Tex. 1979) (emphasis added).
117. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Ehrlich-Bober & Co. v. University of Houston, 49 N.Y.2d 574, 580, 404
N.E.2d 726, 730, 427 N.Y.S.2d 604, 608 (1980) (citing Loucks for the proposition that when
seeking standards of public poilicy, courts "must look to the law as expressed in statute and
judicial decision and to the prevailing attitudes of the community"); Untersteiner v. Unter-
steiner, 32 Wash. App. 859, 863 n.3, 650 P.2d 256, 259 n.3 (1982) (citing Loucks but declar-
ing, "[t]he public policy of this state is found in its constitution, statutes and settled rules
laid down by its courts.").
119. Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley, 622 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1980);
Muma v. Financial Guardian Inc., 551 F. Supp. 119 (E.D. Mich. 1982); Blalock v. Perfect
Subscription Co., 458 F. Supp. 123 (S.D. Ala. 1978), af'd, 599 F.2d 743 (5th Cir. 1979); Gulf
Collateral, Inc. v. Morgan, 415 F. Supp. 319 (S.D. Ga. 1976).
120. Resorts Int'l, Inc. v. Zonis, 577 F. Supp. 876 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Gulf Collateral, Inc. v.
Morgan, 415 F. Supp. 319 (S.D. Ga. 1976).
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protecting creditors while a corporation is "winding up;"' 12 1 a law
prohibiting waiver of a right to file a mechanic's lien; 2 2 a local
statute permitting a judgment creditor seeking child and spousal
support to attach the military pension of a judgment debtor; 123 a
local law governing venue in civil litigation;124 and legislation per-
mitting anyone to own land, regardless of citizenship. 20
Some courts that invoked public policy in their decisions
under the modern learning approach identified case law as their
source. Such courts deemed case law as a source of public policy
sufficient to justify not applying contrary foreign law in the follow-
ing instances: a state supreme court decision declaring gambling
debts contrary to public policy; 2 ' a state supreme court decision
protecting creditors during the "winding up" of a corporation;
21
and a state intermediate appellate court's decision declaring a stat-
ute regulating covenants not to compete a statement of public pol-
icy.128 These statutory and common law sources of public policy
bear striking similarity to the kinds of public policy sources advo-
cates of the modern learning found so distasteful in the early New
York decisions.129
In the ten cases where modern learning courts refused to in-
voke public policy, the following kinds of statutes proved not to be
sufficient sources of public policy: legislation protecting a buyer
from waiver of his right to avoid a sale because the product con-
tained a substantial defect;180 state law governing shareholders' de-
rivative suits;' 3 ' a requirement that in-state real estate sales per-
sonnel hold state licenses;' 3 2 a tavernkeeper's liability statute; "' a
121. Muth v. Educators Sec. Ins. Co., 114 Cal. App. 3d 749, 170 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1981).
122. Clifton Steel Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 80 A.D.2d 714, 437 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1981).
123. In Re Marriage of DeLotel, 73 Cal. App. 3d 21, 140 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1977).
124. Ehrlich-Bober & Co. v. University of Houston, 49 N.Y.2d 574, 404 N.E.2d 726, 427
N.Y.S.2d 604 (1980).
125. Wong v. Tenneco, Inc., 151 Cal. App. 3d 376, 198 Cal. Rptr. 526 (1984). The Wong
court also found public policy in a California constitutional provision declaring that nonci-
tizens and citizens were equally entitled to own land.
126. Resorts Int'l, Inc. v. Zonis, 577 F. Supp. 876 (N.D. Ill. 1984). This case also demon-
strated that courts may find public policy in statutes governing gambling. See supra note
120. As Zonis indicates, some courts have used statutes and judicial decisions as comple-
mentary sources of public policy. 577 F. Supp. at 577.
127. Muth v. Educators Sec. Ins. Co., 114 Cal. App. 3d 749, 170 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1981).
128. Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley, 622 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1980).
129. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
130. Delhomme Indus., Inc. v. Houston Beechcraft, Inc., 669 F.2d 1049 (5th Cir. 1982).
131. Fleeger v. Clarkson Co., 86 F.R.D. 388 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
132. Coldwell Banker & Co. v. Karlock, 686 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1982).
133. Cable v. Sahara Tahoe Corp., 93 Cal. App. 3d 384, 155 Cal. Rptr. 770 (1979).
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prohibition on indemnification clauses in construction contracts; 134
statutory authority to record telephone conversations surrepti-
tiously;135 and legislation establishing interspousal tort immu-
nity."3 ' The modern learning courts also deemed the following
kinds of case law insufficient sources of public policy: a require-
ment that alimony awards take into account a wife's current finan-
cial status and future employment prospects, along with a require-
ment that the award establish a definite termination date;137
prohibitions on tort immunity for owners of leased vehicles;"' and
case law limiting damages in personal injury suits.'39
One may draw several conclusions from the survey of laws that
courts have used to justify invoking public policy in states that
have adopted the modern learning. The first conclusion is that the
kinds of laws that courts have used have a great deal in common
with the kinds of laws that justified invoking forum public policy
under the traditional learning; 40 in particular, their randomness is
of precisely the same order as that which, in the traditional learn-
ing, seemed to offer no basis for predicting when a court might
invoke a public policy exception."4
Another characteristic modern learning public policy seems to
share with traditional learning public policy is the consequence of
a decision not to invoke public policy. In traditional learning cases,
such a decision normally meant that foreign law would apply.
Courts reached that same outcome in eight of the ten modern
learning decisions in which the court rejected a public policy
argument. 42
Comparing all available modern learning public policy cases to
all of their traditional learning counterparts suggests a superficial
134. Champagnie v. W.E. O'Neil Constr. Co., 77 Il1. App. 3d 136, 395 N.E.2d 990
(1979).
135. Becker v. Computer Sciences Corp., 541 F. Supp. 694 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
136. Robertson v. Estate of McKnight, 609 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. 1980).
137. Untersteiner v. Untersteiner, 32 Wash. App. 859, 650 P.2d 256 (1982).
138. Sexton v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 413 Mich. 406, 320 N.W.2d 843 (1982).
139. Gutierez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979).
140. Compare supra notes 41-59 and accompanying text with supra notes 119-39 and
accompanying text.
141. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. The random manner in which tradi-
tional learning courts have used public policy, of course, was a major source of the commen-
tator's criticism. See R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 9, at 84 and accompanying text ("The dan-
ger of the traditional view of public policy is that its operation is likely to be haphazard.").
142. The two exceptions were: Champagnie v. W.E. O'Neil Constr. Co., 77 Ill. App. 3d
136, 395 N.E.2d 990 (1979); and, Becker v. Computer Sciences Corp. 541 F. Supp. 694 (S.D.
Tex. 1982). The courts in these cases applied forum law, because they viewed the forum
state as having the greatest interest in the matter.
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similarity that calls into question assertions that modern learning
public policy is superior. Surveys, however, may emphasize points
of similarity and gloss over details that can mark real differences.
To protect against that possibility, one must examine decisions
from modern learning states in the same manner that this article
examined Michigan and Georgia public policy cases earlier. 143 The
next portion of this paper will, therefore, begin by comparing in
greater detail two cases involving the identical plaintiff and similar
claims, but which were litigated in different states. The paper then
will examine recent public policy decisions in three modern learn-
ing states: New York, the state that has already provided such nu-
tritious fodder for scholarly comment on public policy; California;
and Texas. 144
2. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN GAMBLING DEBTS IN VIRGINIA AND
ILLINOIS
A New Jersey gambling casino recently achieved the dubious
distinction of being on the losing end of two reported cases involv-
ing attempts to enforce gambling debts. Resorts International Ho-
tel, Inc. v. Agresta145 was a suit in Virginia to enforce a gambling
debt enforceable under the law of New Jersey, but null and void if
subject to the law of Virginia. In Virginia, a traditional learning
state, the court refused to enforce the debt. The court reasoned
that a Virginia statute and a state supreme court decision consti-
tuted public policy sufficient to justify non-enforcement. 46 In Re-
143. See supra notes 64-108 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 10-25 and accompanying text. This study only uncovered two re-
cent New York public policy cases. These cases take on added significance, however, because
earlier New York cases played such an important role in the evolution of public policy
doctrine.
The author selected judicial decisions from California for more detailed analysis for two
reasons: (1) in his research for this paper, the author uncovered five recent California deci-
sions involving public policy, which was a sufficient number to constitute a distinct sample;
and, (2) California employs a variant of the modern learning called "comparative impair-
ment," which is at least nominally different from the system employed in many other mod-
ern approach jurisdictions. See infra note 182. Whether comparative impairment in fact
departs significantly from other modern learning approaches, however, is open to question.
See supra note 1; infra notes 176-206 and accompanying text.
Similarly, the author chose Texas decisions for additional analysis because the author
found a sufficient number (four), and because Texas employs still another form of the mod-
ern learning that is embodied in the Second Restatement. See supra note 5. The same
doubts about the novelty of California's approach have similar applicability to the system
adopted by Texas. See infra notes 207-18 and accompanying text.
145. 569 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Va. 1983), afl'd, 725 F.2d 676 (4th Cir. 1984).
146. Id. at 25.
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sorts International Hotel, Inc. v. Zonis,1"" in which the court ap-
plied the modern learning rules of Illinois, the result was the same.
The court refused to enforce the debt, citing Illinois legislation and
case law as sources of public policy.'"
Identical results in similar cases decided under allegedly dif-
ferent rules might be happenstance, but the similarities between
Agresta and Zonis are not only in their results. In Agresta, a court
operating under traditional rules identified forum law contrary to
the law of New Jersey where the gambling debt arose. Once the
Agresta court identified such forum law, it simply declared that
Virginia public policy barred enforcement of the gambling debts
and dismissed the complaint. The court did not attempt, at any
time, to identify any interests Viriginia might have in the case to
justify the application of Virginia law. That failure of analysis, of
course, is central to the criticism that advocates of modern learn-
ing have leveled against the courts' application of traditional pub-
lic policy.'4 9
The Agresta opinion, however, differs in no significant detail
from the modern learning analysis a court used in Illinois. Like
Agresta, Zonis contains only the bare conclusion that Illinois's dif-
fering law constitutes a public policy that should bar enforcement
of the New Jersey debt. Modern learning commentators believe
that the Zonis court did not identify any "underlying policies"
that are necessary to a proper public policy analysis.150 There is, in
short, no difference in the way the two courts, operating under dif-
ferent choice of law rules, analyzed and decided these two similar
147. 577 F. Supp. 876 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
148. Id. at 877-78. A choice of law problem existed in Agresta and Zonis only because
New Jersey would have enforced the gambling debts. This suggests that the casino mis-
played its hand in both cases. If, instead of suing in Virginia and Illinois, the casino had
brought suit in New Jersey, then it could have used that state's long-arm statute to obtain
in personam jurisdiction; thus, the casino could have reduced the gambling debts to judg-
ments. Having obtained final judgments, the casino then could have gone to states where
the defendants had assets and used the judgments to levy on the assets. The defense of
public policy, so effective in barring a cause of action based on a gambling debt, is no de-
fense to a state's constitutional obligation to give full faith and credit to the judgment of a
sister-state. See R. LEFLAB, supra note 1, at 150-51 (public policy not available as a defense
to sister-state judgments).
There is no need, however, to shed tears for gambling establishments. Even in Nevada,
which does not permit its courts to enforce gambling debts, casinos have a startlingly suc-
cessful collection rate. See Flamingo Resort, Inc. v. United States, 485 F. Supp. 926, 928 (D.
Nev. 1980), aff'd, 664 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982) (casino collects
on as much as 96 percent of its outstanding receivables).
149. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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cases.
3. PUBLIC POLICY IN RECENT NEW YORK DECISIONS
The New York courts, now operating under a modern ap-
proach to choice of law, '51 recently decided two public policy cases.
Both decisions held, inter alia, that New York public policy barred
application of foreign law. The older of the two decisions is Erlich-
Bober & Co. v. University of Houston,15 2 in which a New York se-
curities brokerage firm sued a Texas state university to recover on
loans the New York company had made to the defendant. The par-
ties conducted their transactions in part by letter and by tele-
phone. Nonetheless, New York's contacts with the case were
greater than those of Texas, because the parties formulated the
loan contracts in New York. Texas law provided that plaintiffs
could only sue defendants "in two specified counties in Texas. "153
New York law contained no such provision.
The New York Court of Appeals concluded that Texas law
should not apply. An advocate of modern approaches might try to
justify that conclusion by noting the greater number and higher
quality of New York's contacts with the litigation, but the court
apparently did not have enough confidence in its modern approach
to base its decision solely on this ground. Instead, the court tried
to reinforce its "superior interest" analysis by fusing it with public
policy arguments. The resulting language is a fascinating example
of how tortured the reasoning becomes when a court tries to ac-
commodate a modern choice of law approach with public policy.
"Today in New York the determination of whether effect is to be
given foreign legislation is made by comparing it to our own public
policy; and our policy prevails in case of conflict." 15" The court
then retreated far enough to acknowledge that New York public
policy would not apply if New York had no interest in a matter:
151. See Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
New York is clearly a modern learning jurisdiction. Yet, several years ago, the New
York Court of Appeals noted that "[i]t is true that lex loci delicti [a traditional approach]
remains the general rule in tort cases to be displaced only in extraordinary circumstances."
Cousins v. Instrument Flyers, Inc., 44 N.Y.2d 698, 699, 376 N.E.2d 914, 915, 405 N.Y.S.2d
441, 442 (1978). Whether that comment is a harbinger of retreat in New York is not at all
clear. What is clear, however, is that the court of appeals said this in the context of tort
cases, and presumably the traditional approach has no applicability to the two New York
contract decisions that the author analyzes at this point in the study of public policy.
152. 49 N.Y.2d 574, 404 N.E.2d 726, 427 N.Y.S.2d 604 (1980).
153. Id. at 579, 404 N.E.2d at 769, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 607.
154. Id. at 580, 404 N.E.2d at 730, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 608.
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[W]e might, for example, choose to defer to the assertion of in-
terest by another jurisdiction where the interest in question goes
to the very heart of the governmental function. This is not such
a case ....
. . .[The Texas statute is a mere] restrictive venue provi-
sion put in place to serve the administrative convenience of the
State ...
Arrayed against the policy which essentially serves adminis-
trative convenience, is New York's recognized interest in main-
taining and fostering its undisputed status as the preeminent
commercial and financial nerve center of the Nation and the
world. That interest naturally embraces a very strong policy of
assuring ready access to a forum for redress of injuries arising
out of transactions spawned here ....
We conclude, therefore, that when an action concerns a
wholly commercial transaction centered in New York, and it is
one of which the New York courts would otherwise properly
have jurisdiction, they are not precluded from the exercise of
that jurisdiction by an assertion of governmental immunity as a
matter of comity.15
Several comments are in order. First, the standard that the court
used to identify public policy in Erlich-Bober is something quite
different from the "fundamental values" standard Judge Cardozo
identified in Loucks, and much more like the often-criticized defer-
ence to forum law that the Mertz court exhibited. Yet, the Erlich-
Bober court cited Loucks as the source of public policy stan-
dards. 15 " To the extent that Erlich-Bober represents Loucks in ac-
tion under modern approaches, it is clear that a court applying
modern learning does not manifest any of the circumspection in
applying public policy that modern learning advocates would
like.157
Second, as the Erlich-Bober court applied public policy, it is
impossible to determine where public policy ends and a modern
learning assertion of New York's superior interest begins. The two
concepts seem hopelessly tangled. By the lights of the modern
learning, the results may be just, but such doctrinally confused and
haphazard approaches are just what the critics of the traditional
155. Id. at 580-82, 404 N.E.2d at 730-31, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 608-09.
156. Id. at 580, 404 N.E.2d at 730, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 608.
157. See supra notes 12 & 16 and accompanying text (When properly used, public pol-
icy exceptions to application of foreign law should rarely be invoked.).
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application of public policy have criticized so forcefully. "
Finally, and ironically, the traditional approaches offered the
same result that the Erlich-Bober court achieved, but through a
much less tangled analysis. The parties formulated the loan agree-
ments in New York and were to perform them at least partially in
New York. 159 If the court of appeals had employed the traditional
learning, it might reasonably have concluded that those two facts
were sufficient to justify the application of New York law. 160 Had it
done so, the court never would have had to engage in the "haphaz-
ard, brute force type of argument"'' that the court's employment
of New York public policy in a modern learning approach forced
upon it.
In the second New York public policy decision, Clifton Steel
Corp. v. General Electric Co., 62 the plaintiff was a subcontractor
on a construction project in New York. As part of the subcontract,
the plaintiff waived its right to place a mechanic's lien on the pro-
ject in the event that the contractor did not pay the plaintiff. The
subcontract also provided for the application of Connecticut law,
which presumably permitted such a waiver.6 3 When litigation
commenced, the defendant sought to use the waiver clause to resist
the filing of a mechanic's lien. The appellate division, however,
held that New York law, which prohibited such a waiver, applied:
The issue as to whether or not the contract was governed by
Connecticut law is academic as it related to the filing of a
mechanic's lien. New York law specifically prohibits any waiver
of the right to file or enforce such liens as against public policy
(Lien law, §34). It is axiomatic that: "[e]ven if [a] contract is
valid where made, it will not be enforced in another State if it is
repugnant to positive statutory enactment and the public policy
of that State." 164
Nowhere does the Clifton court cite Loucks. More impor-
tantly, the Clifton court identified public policy in a single forum
158. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
159. Ehrlich-Bober, 49 N.Y.2d at 578, 404 N.E.2d at 728, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 606.
160. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 355, 358 (1934).
161. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text (using that language to criticize public
policy as applied in the traditional learning).
162. 80 A.D.2d 714, 437 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1981).
163. The court did not explain what relationship, if any, the parties had to Connecticut.
Because the court did not reject Connecticut law on the ground that Connecticut had no
relationship to the parties or the transaction, it may be reasonable to assume that at least
one of the parties had a strong Connecticut affiliation.
164. Clifton, 80 A.D.2d at 715, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 735.
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statute, which happened to contain a legislative declaration of pub-
lic policy. As a justification for invoking public policy, the source
compares poorly with the sources that Georgia courts used in ap-
plying traditional learning public policy to covenants restricting
competition. 6 ' It also falls far short of the standard that advocates
of the modern learning thought they had identified in Loucks."'
There are other problems with the Clifton court's analysis. For
example, under the modern learning, the court should not have in-
voked forum public policy until it identified forum interests in the
matter justifying its refusal to apply foreign law.167 The fact that
the construction site was located in New York suggests that an ad-
vocate of the modern approaches might have been able to identify
such interests; but this modern learning court named none. In-
stead, it identified and applied a New York statute declaring a
New York prohibition on waiver of mechanic's liens to be New
York public policy. That is precisely the analysis a traditional
learning court would have made-and of which proponents of
modern approaches would have been critical.
A last defense an advocate of modern learning might make for
Clifton is that, although the court did not explain its decision well,
the court's reasoning was sound and consistent with the modern
approaches. One rule in the Second Restatement might seem to
justify that rationalization, but closer scrutiny will expose the flaw.
The Second Restatement, a modern approach analogous to New
York's technique,16s permits a forum to reject the parties' contrac-
tual choice of law if the forum has a "fundamental" policy in oppo-
sition to the other forum's law. 69 The Second Restatement defines
such a policy in the following manner:
To be "fundamental," a policy must in any event be a substan-
tial one .... [A] fundamental policy may be embodied in a
statute which makes one or more kinds of contracts illegal or
which is designed to protect a person against the oppressive use
of superior bargaining power .... To be "fundamental" within
the meaning of the present rule, a policy need not be as strong
as would be required to justify the forum in refusing to entertain
suit upon a foreign cause of action under the rule of §90.110
165. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
168. See Rendleman, supra note 3, at 320-22 (similarity of New York's approach and
Second Restatement); see also supra note 1.
169. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971).
170. Id. comment g.
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One might excuse a person possessed of no additional facts for be-
lieving that such a thought process was at work in Clifton, but it
was not. A clue to the thought process actually operating is the
language that the Clifton court quoted when it invoked public pol-
icy. The Clifton court declared: "It is axiomatic that: 'Even if [a]
contract is valid where made, it will not be enforced in another
State if it is repugnant to positive statutory enactment and the
public policy of that State.' ,,7
"A contract valid where made" evokes memories of the tradi-
tional learning. The Clifton court was quoting Lynch v. Bailey,172 a
New York case decided in 1949, years before the New York courts
abandoned the traditional approaches. One may draw two conclu-
sions from that reliance on the traditional learning. First, Clifton is
aberrational, because the court somehow simply forgot which
choice of law rules it was supposed to use. Such an explanation
might be plausible if New York had recently switched to a modern
approach,7M but that is not the case. New York became a modern
learning state many years ago. In fact, it was one of the first states
to abandon the traditional rules.174 It is, therefore, not credible to
assert that an appellate court in New York does not know by now
which choice of law rules are supposed to be at work in New York.
The second conclusion is that the Clifton court cited an old
case like Lynch, becaude the court was unable to discern a mean-
ingful difference between public policy in the traditional learning
and public policy under New York's current rules. That conclusion
is much more likely to be correct. Moreover, it suggests that in the
two recent New York public policy cases modern public policy
analysis was either identical to that of traditional approaches (Clif-
ton), or produced a tangle of confused reasoning that a traditional
learning court might never have had to enter (Ehrlich-Bober).175
4. PUBLIC POLICY IN CALIFORNIA
Five recent California decisions addressed questions of public
policy. These decisions include four intermediate state appellate
courts and one United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
171. Clifton, 80 A.D.2d at 715, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 735.
172. 275 A.D. 527, 90 N.Y.S.2d 359, aff'd, 300 N.Y. 615, 90 N.E.2d 484 (1949).
173. Cf. supra note 112 (recent change in Michigan's choice of law rules may have
caused confusion in Michigan courts).
174. See Rendleman, supra note 3, at 325 (suggesting New York's new choice of law
rules were a "judicial innovation").
175. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
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cuit decisions. In four of the five cases, the court successfully in-
voked public policy to bar application of foreign law.
The first decision was In Re Marriage of DeLotel,'7 where a
California plaintiff sought to attach a portion of her ex-husband's
military pension in satisfaction of support payments due under an
earlier California decree. The ex-husband was an Oregon domicili-
ary at the time of the suit. Oregon law exempted his pension from
such attachment, as had California law at the time he had moved
from California to Oregon. After his move and before this suit,
however, the California legislature eliminated the exemption. The
appellate court chose to apply California law, thereby making the
ex-husband's pension subject to attachment. The court reasoned
that it could only apply foreign law as a matter of comity, but it
could not consider comity "where to do so would be contrary to the
statutory law or the policy of the state of the forum." 1"
In Cable v. Sahara Tahoe Corp., 78 a California plaintiff sued
a Nevada casino for injuries allegedly arising out of the casino's
negligent sale of alcohol to a third party. The injury-producing ac-
cident occurred in Nevada. California law permitted recovery. Ne-
vada law, on the other hand, contained a criminal prohibition on
such sales but afforded no civil cause of action. The defendant had
substantial business contacts with California, including: a bank ac-
count; purchases of equipment and supplies; and, large expendi-
tures on advertising and promotional activity, intended to solicit
the California customers who made up the bulk of the casino's bus-
iness. 1 79 In short, Cable replicated the facts of the supreme court's
famous decision in Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 80 with one impor-
tant exception; in Bernhard, the highway accident took place in
California. 8'
This single distinction between Bernhard and Cable proved
dispositive. In Bernhard, the court applied California law, because
it concluded that California's regulatory interest in "prevent[ing]
tavern keepers from selling alcoholic beverages to obviously intoxi-
cated persons who are likely to act in California in the intoxicated
state" was paramount. 182 In Cable, by contrast, the appellate court
176. 73 Cal. App. 3d 21, 140 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1977).
177. Id. at 24, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
178. 93 Cal. App. 3d 384, 155 Cal. Rptr. 770 (1979).
179. Id. at 387, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 772.
180. 16 Cal. 3d 313, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, 546 P.2d 719, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976).
181. Id. at 316, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 216, 546 P.2d at 725.
182. California uses a modern choice of law approach which the Cable court described
as "Governmental Interest Analysis' Employing the 'Comparative Impairment Approach.'"
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concluded that Nevada law should apply, because the state policy
so central to Bernhard protected Californians only when their acci-
dents occurred within the state:
The California policy so delimited [in Bernhard] relates only to
Nevada conduct causing injury in California. Our Supreme
Court neither declared nor justified any policy purporting to
protect California residents injured in Nevada. Consequently,
the application of a Nevada rule denying recovery in a case
where both the wrong and the injury occurred in Nevada could
not impair this California policy."' 3
After Cable, however, the three remaining California decisions
invoked public policy to prevent the application of foreign law. In
Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley,'" an employer
sought to enforce a covenant not to compete against a former em-
ployee. The contract contained a provision that required the appli-
cation of Pennsylvania law, but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit concluded that California public policy could, nevertheless,
prevent enforcement of the restrictive covenant.185 The court
found California public policy in a statute declaring such cove-
nants void and in a holding by a California appellate court that the
legislation constituted "a strong public policy."18
In Muth v. Educators Security Insurance Co.,1 87 California
creditors sought to attach land they had sold to a Nebraska insur-
ance company that had become insolvent. The land was located in
California. Pursuant to Nebraska law, a conservator then trans-
ferred those assets (including title to the California land) to an-
93 Cal. App. 3d at 390, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 774. Under that approach, a court is to weigh the
relative importance of the interests of concerned states, and then determine which state's
interest would be more deeply impaired by application of the other state's law. The state
whose important interest would suffer the most is the state whose law the court should
apply. Id. In practice, however, it is not clear that adding the "comparative impairment"
technique to standard modern approach interest analysis changes a great deal. See supra
note 1 (suggesting no significant differences exist in the modern approaches).
183. 93 Cal. App. 3d at 396, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 778.
184. 622 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1980).
185. The court did not actually invoke public policy for procedural reasons. The case
was on appeal of a summary judgment in favor of defendants, and the Ninth Circuit already
had concluded that unresolved factual issues left unclear whether the plaintiff's separate
allegation of misuse of trade secrets could be sustained. Because California would enforce
covenants not to compete when parties intended to protect trade secrets, the Ninth Circuit
could not invoke public policy to prevent enforcement of the covenant; instead, the court
had to remand the case for factfinding to determine whether this particular covenant actu-
ally protected trade secrets. Id. at 1338-39.
186. Id. at 1338.
187. 114 Cal App. 3d 749, 170 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1981).
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other insurance company, receiving in return a promise from the
second insurance company to assume the insurance obligations of
the first company. Only a- nominal share of the insolvent com-
pany's assets remained with the conservator as a fund with which
to wind up corporate affairs and make payments to the company's
creditors. Thus, the conservator had protected the interests of par-
ties holding policies with the insolvent company, but at the ex-
pense of the insolvent company's creditors. The asset transfers and
insurance agreement were apparently lawful under Nebraska law.
In California, however, elaborate provisions existed for the
protection of creditors: "The winding up, dissolution, liquidation,
or reinsurance of an insolvent insurance company is of special con-
cern to the people of this state . . . .By statute, when California's
insurance commissioner becomes the conservator of an insurance
company in a 'hazardous condition,' he becomes a 'trustee for the
benefit of all creditors.' ",188
The court decided that California law should apply for two
reasons. First, the Nebraska conservator's actions constituted "a
practice [that] is contrary to the law and well-established public
policy of this state."' 9 It should come as no surprise that the
court's finding of public policy rested upon state statutes and case
law that conflicted with the Nebraska approach of favoring holders
of insurance policies over other claimants.
When the court in Muth finished explaining why public policy
barred the application of Nebraska law, it added that "[t]here are
other apposite policies and principles [justifying the application of
California law]. It is a universal rule 'that realty is exclusively sub-
ject to the lex loci rei sitae - to the law of the state within which
it is situated.' ,19o The use of a traditional learning situs rule when
the issue before the court relates to realty is, of course, not surpris-
ing. A situs rule for most choice of law questions affecting realty is
one feature of the traditional approach that the courts have rou-
tinely carried over to the modern approaches. 191 Its use in Muth,
thus, would be uneventful but for the way in which a modern
learning California court decided the most recent of the California
public policy cases and to which we now turn.
188. Id. at 758, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 853-54 (emphasis in the original).
189. Id. at 758, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 853.
190. Id. at 759, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
191. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 222 (1971) (suggesting
situs law most frequently applies because the situs state is usually the most interested
state).
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In Wong v. Tenneco, Inc.,9 2 a California farmer who con-
trolled some land in Mexico sued to recover for breach of contract
and tortious interference with business relationships. The dispute
arose from a transaction in which the defendant had agreed to
market some of the farmer's crops. The farmer's interest in the
Mexican land was what the court described as de facto; he was not
the legal owner of record, because both the constitution and the
laws of Mexico prohibited foreign ownership of Mexican soil. 19
The farmer, therefore, had concealed his interest in the land be-
hind some cooperative Mexican citizens. "They took legal title to
the real and personal property in Mexico with the understanding
that Wong remained the 'true owner." ""
After Muth, one might have expected the court to apply Mexi-
can law and refuse to enforce the plaintiff's cause of action given
the situs of the land in Mexico and the importance of the issue of
ownership to Mexican national interests. Instead, the court con-
cluded that application of Mexican law would violate a California
public policy. "California's public policy, as expressed in its consti-
tution and statutes, is to allow ownership of property without re-
gard to citizenship. 1 95 In other words, California public policy now
extended to title in Mexican land.
Taken as a whole, the five California decisions do not evidence
192. 151 Cal. App. 3d 376, 198 Cal. Rptr. 526 (1984).
193. Mexican law also made unenforceable contracts based upon such foreign owner-
ship, and provided civil and criminal sanctions against those who violated the constitutional
and statutory prohibition. Id. at 380, 384 n.6, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 528, 530 n.6.
194. Id. at 380, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 529.
195. Id. at 383-84, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 530-31. To be on the safe side, the Wong court also
concluded that under California's approach to interest analysis California law was the ap-
propriate choice. One passage summed up the court's reasoning:
Application of Mexican law in this case would completely impair California's
interests in compensation, punishment and deterrence. Application of California
law, however, would only partially impair Mexico's interests. Violations of the
Mexican law applied below carry civil and criminal penalties in addition to the
sanction of unenforceability. Mexico can advance its interests by imposing those
additional penalties even without our upholding the sanction of unenforceab-
lility in this case. Thus California law, whose underlying interests would be the
most impaired, should be applied.
Id. at 380-84, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 530-31. In other words, if Mexico had viewed its interest as
less important and had not enacted civil and criminal sanctions to enforce its prohibition,
then it would have had a greater chance to have a foreign court apply its law. Conversely,
under Culifornia's interest analysis, if California had viewed its interest as important
enough to justify imposing a criminal sanction, then there would have been a greater chance
that the court would not have applied California's law enforcing the contract.
Discussion of such reasoning is not central to an investigation of public policy doctrine
in traditional and modern learning, but it does suggest just how manipulative the allegedly
"certain" and "predictable" modern approaches can be. See supra note 3.
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the superiority of modern learning public policy doctrine. In fact,
those decisions at best indicate a great deal of similarity between
the application of public policy in the traditional and modern
learning. At their worst, they suggest a degree of arbitrariness in
modern learning public policy that one does not find in traditional
learning states.
In three of the California cases - DeLotel, Hollingsworth,
and Muth - the courts applied an analysis that is similar to the
traditional learning. The DeLotel court, in a suit to attach a mili-
tary pension, concluded that foreign law could not apply, because
it conflicted with forum statutory law.196 This mere difference in
law was sufficient. Moreover, because the DeLotel court did not
identify the policy behind California's attachment law that justi-
fied a rejection of the foreign law, one may criticize Delotel for the
same reason commentators have been critical of the traditional ap-
proach to public policy. 9 '
In Hollingsworth, the similarity between modern and tradi-
tional approaches is even more striking. Not only did the court
make the sort of cursory public policy analysis that infected
DeLotel, it also found public policy in a forum law prohibiting
many restrictive covenants. Courts have routinely cited statutes as
a source of public policy in both traditional and modern learning
states. 98
Muth also reminds one of traditional learning, but with a
twist. One justification for the decision to apply forum law was
that the land at issue was located within California, but that was
not the court's primary reason for the decision. The court was ex-
plicit in using the situs of the land as among "other apposite poli-
cies and principles" justifying application of forum law. " As the
court explained it, the primary reason for its decision to apply Cal-
ifornia law was the forum's public policy of protecting creditors of
insolvent insurance companies in a way that foreign law would
not.
20 0
In the traditional learning, by contrast, courts invoke public
policy, if at all, only when other choice of law rules do not mandate
196. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. Indeed, many traditional learning
states have declared they would not do what the DeLotel court did. See supra note 33 and
accompanying text (suggesting mere dissimilarity does not justify invocation of forum public
policy).
197. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 42 & 119 and accompanying text.
199. Muth, 114 Cal. App. 3d at 759, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
200. Id. at 758-59, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 853-54.
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application of forum law. 01 Indeed, this is why Professor Sedler
denounced traditional learning public policy as a "manipulative
technique," intended to achieve justice in individual cases at the
price of doing violence to the predictability that consistent applica-
tion of sound choice of law rules should achieve.2 02 In Muth, how-
ever, a modern learning court carried that "manipulative" practice
one step further. Apparently lacking sufficient confidence in the
analytical tools that the modern approach provides - ironically, a
set of tools in this case very similar to those available in the tradi-
tional learning - the court rejected an opportunity to rest its deci-
sion primarily on the result of a modern interest analysis. Instead,
it reached first for public policy doctrine, and used modern learn-
ing analysis only as a backdrop. If public policy, as an exception to
the traditional learning, is a "manipulative device," how much
worse is it when the "manipulative device" actually displaces the
primary rule?
DeLotel, Hollingsworth, and Muth suggest that California
courts do not apply public policy any better than their traditional
learning counterparts. Wong indicates that California courts also
can do much worse. The court in Wong refused to apply the law of
the sovereign in which realty was located, notwithstanding the ap-
parently profound importance that Mexico attaches to preventing
foreign ownership of its soil. This result alone seems to make
Wong inconsistent with and probably inferior to Muth2' 0 - a not
particularly distinguished decision itself. Yet, Wong is worse, be-
cause it uses California's policy toward its own land as cause to
second-guess Mexican policy toward Mexican land. One cannot
conjure a better example of the "brute force" use of public policy
that advocates of the modern learning so dislike than the examples
201. See supra note 4.
202. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 7-9 and ac-
companying text.
203. The only escape from the conclusion that the court poorly decided Wong, even by
the standard of Muth, may lie in the assertion that Wong is not a property case at all, but a
dispute over a contract relating to property. If one accepts that proposition, it might follow
that the situs of the affected land is less important than the preponderant interest in the
contract which California might have had. Such a rationale, of course, requires a characteri-
zation of Wong as a contract action. Commentators, however, have criticized precisely that
sort of characterization (when it has appeared in the traditional learning) as another result-
oriented "manipulative technique," as arbitrary as public policy. See R. LEFLAR, supra note
1, § 88, at 178 ("[Tlhe characterization technique is being used to achieve results that must
be justified, if at all, by other real reasons. That other real reasons may exist cannot be
doubted. The valid questions are as to what the real reasons are, and why a cover-up device
should be manipulated to conceal them.").
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that appear in modern approach states.04
Of the five California cases, only Cable seems to shelter mod-
ern learning advocates, and even there, the refuge is a mirage. Al-
though devout advocates of modern theories might divine a dem-
onstration of the success of a modern approach in Cable, one can
see that the court strained in its application of modern learning
techniques - techniques that do not adjust well to real-world
problems. As we saw earlier, with the single exception of the situs
of the accident, Cable is identical on its facts to the more famous
California case of Bernhard v. Harrah's Club.2 5 In both cases, Cal-
ifornia had a substantial interest in furthering a California plain-
tiff's recovery in order to avoid a burdensome increase in the wel-
fare rolls. In both cases, the Nevada defendant had substantial
contacts with California, including the solicitation of California cit-
izens' business. Moreover, in both cases, the defendants' business
operations were located close enough to the California border so
that they could have foreseen that serving alcohol to already over-
indulged customers could have tragic consequences in California.
In Bernhard, those facts, combined with the situs of the ensuing
accident in California, produced a decision to apply California law.
In Cable, the court acknowledged the force of the policy behind
the decision in Bernhard, but concluded that the Supreme Court
of California could not have intended to extend the Bernhard pol-
icy of discouraging service to drunken customers into the territo-
rial confines of other states.
This conclusion seems reasonable; the alternative would raise
the possibility that California policy, as expressed in Bernhard,
might sweep across the land, not to say the world. Nonetheless, the
rationale of Bernhard does not rest on the happenstance of situs.
As long as the defendant has contacts with California and can fore-
see potential consequences in California, Bernhard requires the
application of California law. In short, although Cable's result is
reasonable, one cannot explain it through the use of the Bernhard
approach. One can only understand Cable by acknowledging the
importance of situs in its own right - without allowing situs to
falsely aggrandize the interests of either California or Nevada. As a
rational retreat to situs law, the decision is sound; yet, if there is
something wrong with Cable, it is the court's inability to com-
pletely jettison Bernhard and more frankly recognize the overrid-
204. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
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ing importance of situs as manifested in the traditional learning.
In short, not all of the California decisions are absolutely
wrong. Moreover, reasonable people may differ about the quality of
analysis in a few of the decisions. Yet, even if one gives the Califor-
nia courts the benefit of all reasonable doubt, their public policy
decisions are not obviously better than traditional learning public
policy decisions. At their worst, the California cases may be, in the
words Professor Sedler used to describe Michigan public policy
cases, one "big mess." 20
6
Thus, neither California nor New York has vindicated the as-
sessment that public policy works better in the modern systems.
Surprisingly, it appears that Texas courts have done better.
5. PUBLIC POLICY IN TEXAS
In 1979, the Supreme Court of Texas adopted the modern ap-
proach embodied in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS 207 in Gutierrez v. Collins,20 8 a suit between two Texas resi-
dents arising from an automobile accident in Mexico. The Gutier-
rez court also described how public policy doctrine would operate
within Texas's new choice of law rules: "Texas courts will not en-
force a foreign law that violates good morals, natural justice or is
prejudicial to the general interests of our own citizens. '20 9 That
standard seemed to afford a great deal of flexibility in the use of
public policy, and probably does not meet the ideal of Loucks that
choice of law commentators often praise. 10 In Gutierrez, however,
the court applied the standard rather circumspectly.
Mexican law provided measures of damages different from
those in Texas, but the Supreme Court of Texas held that mere
dissimilarity would not justify the court's invocation of public pol-
icy. After identifying the differences in detail, the court held that
206. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
207. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).
208. 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979).
209. Id. at 321. Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Texas cited to one of its decisions
from 1967, thereby suggesting that it did not believe the change from traditional learning to
modern learning would have any significant impact on the way public policy doctrine would
operate in Texas. The court also made the following comment about the use of public policy
generally: "This [the court's standard for invoking public policy] is a limitation recognized
by all jurisdictions." Id. If that disarming statement from the Supreme Court of Texas is
accurate-and the data developed in this article suggests that the court was not far from the
mark-all the straining that advocates of the modern learning have done to disassociate
their doctrines from traditional learning public policy appears to be a wasted effort.
210. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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"the mere fact that these aspects of the law differ from ours does
not render them violative of public policy. . . . [TIhere is nothing
in the substance of these laws inimical to good morals, natural jus-
tice, or the general interests of the citizens of this state." '211 Al-
though the Gutierrez court's view of public policy was conclusory,
it apparently established a practice of circumspection in using the
doctrine that other courts in Texas have followed.
After Gutierrez, three other Texas courts addressed public
policy questions; each time, the court refused to invoke forum pub-
lic policy. In Fleeger v. Clarkson Co.,2 1 2 a Texas plaintiff sued over
a Canadian receiver's settlement of claims against a bankrupt Ca-
nadian corporation in which the plaintiff had stock. A Canadian
court had previously approved the transactions at issue. The plain-
tiff, however, argued that the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas should not afford comity to that judi-
cial decision, because differing Canadian judicial procedures vio-
lated Texas public policy. The court had little difficulty brushing
aside that argument. Citing to the same definition of public policy
that the Supreme Court of Texas had cited in Gutierrez, the court
concluded that Canadian procedures were merely different, "not
abhorrent to a United States court and . . . not against 'good
morals or natural justice . . . or prejudicial to the general interests
of [U.S.] citizens.'-21
In Robertson v. Estate of McKnight,214 the Supreme Court of
Texas applied foreign law over a public policy objection. A Texas
air crash killed a New Mexico husband and wife, and the wife's
estate brought suit against the husband's estate. Texas legislation
established interspousal tort immunity, but New Mexico would
have allowed the suit. After concluding that New Mexico had the
most significant relationship to the parties, the court reversed the
lower court's holding that New Mexico law violated Texas public
policy. The court also utilized the definition of public policy that it
had approved in Gutierrez, and concluded: "While Texas does not
permit spouses to recover from each other for negligently inflicted
injuries, a rule which does permit such a suit does not violate good
morals or natural justice. We note that a large number of states do
211. Gutierrez, 583 S.W.2d at 322.
212. 86 F.R.D. 388 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
213. Id. at 394. The brackets within the quote are in the original. For reasons not en-
tirely clear, the federal district court substituted the bracketed "U.S." for the words "our
own" (meaning Texans) in the original language.
214. 609 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. 1980).
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permit such suits. '215
Finally, in Becker v. Computer Sciences Corp.,2"6 a California
defendant counterclaimed against a Texas plaintiff who had sur-
reptitiously recorded telephone conversations that had taken place
between California and Texas. In California, such activity triggered
criminal sanctions as well as the possibility of civil liability. Texas
law, however, permitted such recordings with the consent of one of
the parties. The plaintiff argued that application of California law
would violate Texas policy. The United States District Court for
the Southern District of Texas disagreed:
The fact that the State of California has sought to protect its
citizens' rights to privacy to a greater degree than the State of
Texas, and apparently a number of states also recognize such
rights ... does not provide a sufficient basis to support a find-
ing that the California statute violates "good morals, natural
justice or is prejudicial to the general interests of its citizens."1' 17
The Texas cases have a number of elements in common: first,
all of the cases arose in a tort context; second, each court identified
the same sweeping language when describing circumstances that
might trigger the invocation of forum public policy; third, each
court refused to invoke public policy; finally, in deciding not to
apply forum public policy, each court was conclusory in its public
policy analysis. The result is that after these four decisions, parties
will still find it difficult to predict with confidence when Texas
courts may apply public policy - save for two useful guidelines:
first, when a foreign law is merely dissimilar, Texas courts will not
apply forum public policy; second, when the foreign law has
achieved some general acceptance in states other than Texas, the
Texas courts will be less inclined to find in it a violation of good
morals or natural justice.18 Although the record of the Texas
courts may not be profoundly successful, it does provide some
cause for solace for those commentators who believe that public
policy can be a coherent doctrine when it is measured against the
performance of courts in other states.
215. Id. at 537.
216. 541 F. Supp. 694 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
217. Id. at 703. While rejecting public policy, the court applied Texas law anyway on
the ground that Texas was the state with the most significant relationship. Id. at 706.
218. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also Delhomme Indus., Inc. v. Hous-
ton Beechcraft, 669 F.2d 1049 (5th Cir. 1982) (suggesting that because the Uniform Com-
mercial Code is the law of 49 states it does not violate good morals in Louisiana).
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V. CONCLUSION
One may draw two conclusions from this study of public pol-
icy. The first conclusion deals with how the courts may be able to
transform public policy into a more rational choice of law tool. The
second and probably more important conclusion concerns the
shortcomings of modern choice of law approaches, and the reason-
able expectations that we should have for any choice of law system.
A. Improvements in Public Policy
No matter how much uncertainty there may be in applying
public policy doctrine, the experience of American courts since
Loucks makes one point unmistakably clear: public policy is not
likely to fade away. Both traditional and modern learning courts
continue to find it a handy tool, and there is no sign that courts
belonging to either choice of law school will discontinue using it. It
may be, as Professor Lorenzen remarked sixty years ago, that the
use of such a doctrine is cause for questioning the quality of the
choice of law system which employs it.2"' Even so, courts will con-
tinue to use it. At this stage of our experience with public policy,
therefore, courts should endeavor to improve an admittedly flawed
doctrine, rather than try to abolish it altogether.
Reform, as opposed to abolition, can begin with small steps.
The first step is to recognize what is known, and thereby isolate
what is not known. A generation ago, Professors Paulsen and
Sovern informed us that courts do not employ public policy in a
wholesale fashion; they only apply it when the forum has an im-
portant interest in the matter at issue.220 Nothing in this study has
eroded the validity of this observation. 22' Thus, if courts do not
invoke public policy promiscuously, then the doctrine itself may
create only small problems, notwithstanding the attention advo-
cates of modern learning have accorded it in the course of their
attacks on the traditional rules. 22
219. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 7.
221. In fact, one Georgia court was explicit in supporting their finding. See Terry v.
Mays, 161 Ga. App. 328, 329, 291 S.E.2d 44, 45 (1982) (denying the invocation of Georgia
public policy as to a contract made in South Carolina and primarily to be performed in
South Carolina, because Georgia had no interest in such a contract).
222. See, e.g., supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text. Taken in conjunction with other
defects of a choice of law system, of course, public policy may still contribute to a generally
unsatisfactory situation. Recognition that public policy may not itself be a major obstacle to
effective choice of law rules, however, suggests that efforts to improve choice of law should
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If Professors Paulsen and Sovern brought good news, the bad
news remains that American courts share very little other common
ground with regard to public policy. In fact, the values that have
triggered,2 3 or not triggered,2"' the invocation of public policy re-
main strikingly different in different courts, and sometimes even in
the same court.22 The bad news, however, may be less consequent-
ial than it first appears.
When considering a doctrine such as public policy, one might
expect this nationwide lack of uniformity in the values that trigger
its invocation. Since the days of Judge Cardozo and his decision in
Loucks, courts have only considered local values and not national
ones. Given the heterogeneity of the country at large, it is no sur-
prise that community values differ significantly. Such differences,
however, need not be consequential for public policy, because the
uniformity necessary to make the doctrine work well must occur
within a state, not necessarily among the states.
Depending on the particular state that one examines, there
may be cause for some optimism for a consistent and principled
application of the public policy doctrine. Recently, Georgia and
Texas, for example, appear to have done fairly well in developing
their respective doctrines.22 6 Additional experience may expose
their apparent success as mere fortuity, but at least for now, those
states seem to be laying a foundation for a principled and defensi-
ble employment of public policy.
In public policy, unfortunately, there seems to be at least one
failure for every success. For every Georgia or Texas that makes a
bit of progress, there appears to be a Michigan or California still
stuck in a morass of logically inconsistent decisions.227 Stare deci-
sis may offer some limited hope for less successful jurisdictions.
Even if one cannot logically harmonize two public policy decisions
in a particular state, these decisions may still serve some utility as
precedent for predicting when courts will invoke the doctrine. Pre-
dictability without reason is certainly less desirable than principled
predictability; yet, it is better than no predictability at all. Perhaps
for now, that is as much as we may reasonably expect in some
jurisdictions.
probably concentrate on other questions.
223. See supra notes 41-51 & 119-29 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 52-59 & 130-39 and accompanying text.
225. See, e.g., supra notes 64-74 & 172-202 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 75-94 & 207-18 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 64-74 & 176-206 and accompanying text.
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B. Public Policy and Choice of Law
This study has established that, irrespective of the choice of
law system employed, there will be an irreducible number of cases
in which courts will be inclined to employ public policy doctrine.228
Moreover, the decisions in many of these cases may not necessarily
be doctrinally consistent. Instead, these decisions sometimes rest
only on the judicial intuition that foreign law should simply not
apply - even if the judge cannot quite articulate reasons why the
forum's values reject this particular law and not others. That one
can find such cases in both traditional and modern learning courts
suggests that public policy as applied turns out differently from
what advocates of modern learning believed. Contrary to their the-
sis, there is no evidence that modern choice of law approaches have
imposed improved reasoning on the operation of public policy doc-
trine.29 An immediate reaction to that finding is the suspicion that
perhaps the modern approaches actually operate no better than
the traditional learning in other choice of law areas as well.
There is something more important, however, that this study
may teach about expectations and results in choice of law. The
modern systems developed in response to dissatisfaction with the
existing traditional rules. These rules seemed to work well in the
majority of cases; yet, their seeming rigidity forced judges to make
a difficult choice between adhering to rules that might produce in-
justice in a particular case and disregarding the rule and dispens-
ing justice at the cost of destroying consistency and predictability
- the greatest strength of the traditional learning.2 30 It was largely
for those cases, unprovided for in the traditional system, that the
modern learning sought to overturn the established rules.
The experience of public policy suggests, however, that the en-
terprise has fallen short. Judges continue to identify cases unpro-
vided for in the traditional system, but for which modern analysis
seems to offer no superior solution. In short, for all the ferment the
modern learning has produced, we seem not to be appreciably bet-
ter off now than we were before modern systems carried the day.
Indeed, considering the significant costs in confusion attendant
228. See supra notes 41-63 & 109-44 and accompanying text.
229. See, e.g., R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 16; cf. P.J. Kozyris, Newsletter to Association
of American Law Schools, Section on Conflict of Laws 1 (Oct. 3, 1984) ("[linterests [sic]
analysis . . . woes so many courts and commentators [as] demonstrated by the increasing
challenges to its very foundations.").
230. See R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 9, § 6.1, at 266-67 (suggesting the traditional rule
often produced either injustice or inconsistency in tort).
19851
696 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:647
upon any major change in law such as choice of law, we may be
somewhat worse off.
If so, the lesson is not that we should reject change that
promises improvement, because we fear incurring some costs. Yet,
the costs that we have experienced in moving from the traditional
to the modern learning suggest that, before we reject a system that
does not address all cases satisfactorily, we first should consider
how significant such an inadequacy actually is. Perfection may ex-
ist somewhere on this planet, but it does not exist in choice of law.
